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PRE-CRIME RESTRAINTS: THE EXPLOSION OF
TARGETED, NONCUSTODIAL PREVENTION
Jennifer C. Daskal†
This Article exposes the ways in which noncustodial pre-crime restraints
have proliferated over the past decade, focusing in particular on three notable
examples—terrorism-related financial sanctions, the No Fly List, and the
array of residential, employment, and related restrictions imposed on sex of-
fenders.  Because such restraints do not involve physical incapacitation, they
are rarely deemed to infringe core liberty interests.  Because they are preven-
tive, not punitive, criminal law procedural protections do not apply.  They
have exploded largely unchecked—subject to little more than bare rationality
review and negligible procedural protections—and without any coherent the-
ory as to their appropriate limits.
The Article examines this category of noncustodial pre-crime restraints
as a whole and develops a framework for evaluating, limiting, and legitimiz-
ing their use.  It accepts the preventive frame in which they operate but ar-
gues that in some instances, noncustodial restraints can so thoroughly
constrain an individual’s functioning that they are equivalent to de facto
imprisonment and ought to be treated as such.  Even in the more common
case of partial restraints, enhanced substantive and procedural safeguards
are needed to preserve the respect for individuals’ equal dignity, freedom of
choice, and moral autonomy at the heart of the liberty interest that the Consti-
tution and a just society protect.
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INTRODUCTION
Most of us intuitively think that it makes sense to deny someone
an opportunity to board a plane if there are reasonable grounds to
believe that he or she will try to blow it up once on board.  We also
believe that it is reasonable to freeze an entity’s assets if it would other-
wise spirit money to al Qaeda’s coffers.  And we tend to agree that it is
sound policy to prohibit someone with a history of sexually abusing
children from working in an elementary school.
But there is a grave danger that what starts out as a
reasonable-sounding security measure operates as a one-way ratchet,
increasing in scope and severity over time.  We have, for example,
seen the lists of suspected terrorists who are prohibited from flying,
opening a bank account, or entering the country swell over the last
decade.1  Similarly, the array of offenses that trigger the label of “dan-
gerous sex offender” has ballooned, and the severity of the associated
residential and employment restrictions has increased as well.2  Mean-
while, getting oneself removed from such a list involves establishing a
nearly impossible-to-establish fact about the future: that one will not
do whatever bad act the restriction is designed to prevent.3
These types of restrictions—what I call targeted, noncustodial
pre-crime restraints4—have proliferated over the past decade.  The re-
1 See infra notes 13, 20. R
2 See infra notes 14, 107 and accompanying text. R
3 See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
4 The term “precrime” was coined in Phillip K. Dick’s short story, The Minority Report,
first published in 1987 and made into a hit movie in 2002. See PHILLIP K. DICK, MINORITY
REPORT 4 (1987). While both the story and movie focus on what is often labeled “prepun-
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straints are justified by asserted security needs, based on an assessment
that a particular individual or entity is likely to commit a future bad
act.  They are deemed preventive, not punitive, and therefore are not
subject to the array of procedural protections that apply to criminal
law sanctions.5  Because they do not involve custodial restraint or dis-
criminate (at least overtly) based on race or gender, they are subject
to minimal substantive scrutiny and minimal procedural safeguards.
While most prevalent in the national security realm, they also arise in
the efforts to prevent presumptively dangerous sex offenders, aliens,
and spousal abusers from striking.6  In some cases, the restrictions are
so severe that they amount to a near-total deprivation of the ability to
participate in society or to live a meaningful or free life.  In other
cases, the restrictions are not so extensive but affirmatively restrain
their targets’ liberty and stamp them as a presumptively dangerous
underclass.7
For example, under the rubric of preventing terrorism financing,
the Secretaries of State and Treasury have far-reaching authority to
designate entities and individuals as “specially designated global ter-
rorists,” freeze their assets, and prohibit all transactions with the desig-
nated groups or people.8  For the dozen U.S.-based entities that have
been listed, such a designation is an effective death knell.9  For U.S.
residents, it is the equivalent of labeling the individual with a radioac-
tive scarlet letter A.  Designated individuals cannot buy groceries, pay
their rent, or receive medical care without a license from the govern-
ment.10  Providers of goods or services to such entities or organiza-
tions are themselves subject to listing as specially designated global
terrorists as well as civil and criminal penalties.11  Reviewing courts in
the United States have emphasized process rights, if they have exer-
cised review at all, while continuing to defer to the Executive’s deter-
mination as to the criteria for and the fact of designation.12  A list that
designated twenty-seven individuals and entities when it was first an-
nounced by President George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001,
ishment,” I focus on the broader category of pre-crime; that is, nonpunitive measures that
take place outside and on the margins of the criminal justice system and are designed to
prevent future bad acts without any explicit retributive purpose.
5 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Foreword, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and
the Criminal–Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 777 (1997) (describing the “sharp
procedural divide between criminal and civil cases”).
6 See discussion infra Part I.
7 See discussion infra Part II.A.
8 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001); see discussion infra
Part I.A.
9 See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 65 and accompanying text. R
11 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2012).
12 See discussion infra notes 71–79 and accompanying text. R
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terrorist attacks has grown to more than 700 (mostly non-U.S. citi-
zens) as of September 2013.13
The effort to control sex offenders has resulted in a combination
of restrictions so pervasive that it has led to banishment from a num-
ber of towns and cities.14  Some have been forced into homelessness—
living on the street or under bridges because there is no other place
for them to go.15  Others can no longer take their children to play in
local parks or other public places, even if they qualify for the “sex
offender” label because of statutory rape as a teenager or a single,
decades-old indecent-exposure conviction.16
13 See SDN Search, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, http://sdnsearch.ofac.treas
.gov/default.aspx (last updated Nov. 14, 2013); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE
OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, TERRORIST ASSETS REPORT 5 (2012), available at http://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/tar2012.pdf (“As of De-
cember 31, 2012, a total of 731 individuals and entities had been designated . . . .”).  As of
this writing, nine are U.S.-based entities and one is a U.S. citizen, although other U.S.-
based entities and persons were previously listed.  U.S. residents and citizens face criminal
prosecution and possible designation if they provide any support to any of the designated
entities, and individuals are, according to reviewing courts, prohibited from collaterally
attacking the underlying designation. See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 977 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d
1322, 1343–46 (M.D. Fla. 2004).  Foreign nationals on the list are also often subject to
additional sanctions and travel bans imposed by the United Nations Security Council, their
home countries, and other countries where they reside or conduct business, although as-
pects of this scheme have been successfully challenged in court. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-
402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council of the European Union and EC
Commission, 3 C.M.L.R. 46 (2008) (finding due process violations in the United Nations’
listing scheme); Nada v. Switzerland, App. No. 10593/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (finding that
travel ban violated right to respect for privacy and family life given particular circum-
stances); S.C. Res. 1904, ¶¶ 20–27, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009) (responding to
court challenges by, among other things, creating the Office of the Ombudsperson to deal
with delisting requests).
14 See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 724–25 (8th Cir. 2005) (Melloy, J., dissenting)
(describing onerous residential restrictions that effectively bar sex offenders from living in
a number of Iowa’s small towns and cities).  For interesting analyses of the ways in which
civil restraints effectively turn classes of individuals into outlaws, see Gabriel J. Chin, The
New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789,
1790–91 (2012) (discussing how the collateral consequences of conviction amount to a
substantial loss of civil rights); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services,
Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1436–40
(1995) (discussing restrictions imposed on illegal aliens).
15 See, e.g., Jill Levenson, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS:
FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 267, 279–80 (Richard G. Wright ed., 2009) (describing
lack of housing options for sex offenders and resulting homelessness); Greg Allen, Sex
Offenders Forced to Live Under Miami Bridge, NPR (May 20, 2009), http://www.npr.org/tem
plates/story/story.php?storyId=104150499.  Some jurisdictions have even made it difficult
to be homeless, prohibiting sex offenders from staying in regulated homeless encamp-
ments or otherwise placing limits on their movements. See, e.g., Jordan Talge, No Direction
Home: Constitutional Limitations on Washington’s Homeless Encampment Ordinances, 85 WASH. L.
REV. 781, 789 n.55 (2010) (listing prohibitions on sex offenders entering homeless en-
campments in the state of Washington).
16 See, e.g., Ian Lovett, Public-Place Laws Tighten Rein on Sex Offenders but Raise Questions,
Too, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2012, at A15 (“[A lawyer with the Orange County public de-
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Many pre-crime restrictions are less comprehensive but impose
significant and often underappreciated costs on the targeted individ-
ual nonetheless.  The No Fly List, an FBI-managed database that lists
thousands of suspected terrorists who are prohibited from traveling by
plane, is one such example.  In some cases, U.S. citizens and residents
have been barred from returning by plane to the United States and
told to take a ship instead.17  Meanwhile, the government refuses to
acknowledge who is included on the list or to specify the standards it
uses to place individuals on the list.18  Even those who have been
turned away at the airport with a ticket in hand are told that the gov-
ernment can neither confirm nor deny whether they are listed individ-
uals.19  Recent reporting suggests there are approximately 21,000
people on the No Fly List, including an estimated 500 U.S. citizens.20
All of these restrictions share common features: they are targeted
at particular individuals, entities, or categories of individuals; they im-
pose noncustodial restrictions; and they are preventive in both pur-
pose and effect.  Because of these latter two features—their
noncustodial, nonpunitive nature—courts and scholars have sub-
jected them to significantly less scrutiny than other forms of govern-
mental sanction.21  Detention and other forms of physical restraint
fender’s office] said she had a stack of cases involving people who were arrested for urinat-
ing in public in the 1970s and pleaded guilty to indecent exposure without realizing they
would have to register as sex offenders.”).
17 See, e.g., Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for
Summary Judgment at 26, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR (D. Or. Nov. 17, 2010)
[hereinafter Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Latif v. Holder] (emphasizing that “[i]t may be less
convenient or more expensive to travel by ship or bus, but this factor does not impinge on
the constitutional right to travel”); Peter Finn, Detained Va. Teen Set to Return to U.S., WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 2011, at B1 (detailing the experiences of a teenager reportedly placed on the
No Fly List).
18 See Eileen Sullivan, U.S. Secret No-Fly List Doubles in 1 Year, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 2,
2012), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/world/53432678-68/list-government-fly-watch
.html.csp (“The government will not tell people whether they’re on the list or why they’re
on it . . . .”).
19 Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Latif v. Holder, supra note 17, at 41 (explaining that the gov- R
ernment does not “confirm or deny whether particular individuals are now or ever have
been [included on the No Fly List] because to do so would in effect disclose the fact that
the individuals in question are currently or once were the subjects of counterterrorism
intelligence-gathering or investigative activity by the federal government”).
20 See Carol Cratty, 21,000 People Now on U.S. No Fly List, CNN (Feb. 2, 2012), http://
security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/02/21000-people-now-on-u-s-no-fly-list/; Sullivan, supra
note 18.  The United States does not officially disclose the numbers of people on the List, R
which is regularly updated.
21 A notable exception is Professor Erin Murphy’s excellent work, Paradigms of Re-
straint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1322 (2008).  Murphy’s focus, however, differs from mine in that
she is primarily concerned with what she calls the “technologies of control,” the links be-
tween surveillance technology and the increased tracking and monitoring of individuals.
Id. at 1328–29.  I, by comparison, focus exclusively on those government-imposed restraints
that cross over from tracking and monitoring to imposing targeted, affirmative restrictions
on what individuals can do and where they can go.  I emphasize in particular the evolution,
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infringe entrenched liberty interests, and government-imposed pun-
ishment triggers an array of procedural protections and is subject to
clear restrictions (such as prohibitions on ex post facto laws, bills of
attainder, and cruel and unusual punishment).  By contrast, liberty
interests that do not involve physical incapacitation or bodily intru-
sions are rarely considered “core” and tend to be both undervalued
and undertheorized.22  Meanwhile, the boundaries of the preventive
state are ill defined and unsettled, with no clear limits as to whether,
when, and how the state can engage in targeted sanctions in the name
of stopping a future bad act.23
This Article examines the category of targeted, noncustodial pre-
crime sanctions as a whole, offering a framework for courts and legis-
lators to evaluate such restrictions going forward.24  In Part I, I detail
examples of targeted, noncustodial and pre-crime sanctions that oper-
ate in a number of different contexts.  Specifically, I focus on targeted
financial sanctions, the No Fly List, and residential and other restric-
tions placed on presumptively dangerous sex offenders.
In Part II, I examine why such restraints raise particular concerns
and why they have evaded sufficient scrutiny to date—reasons related
to their noncustodial and preventive nature.  In some, albeit limited,
instances, noncustodial restraints can so fully prevent the target from
living a free and meaningful life that the restraints should be consid-
purpose, and effect of three such targeted, affirmative restraints, giving detailed scrutiny to
the liberty interests at stake and risks of error and overreach.
22 See id. at 1326 (“[W]hereas a rich debate explores the potential for abuse of physi-
cal incapacitation, whether as a matter of criminal sanction or ‘regulatory’ control, a corre-
sponding dialogue surrounding the risks posed by nonphysical . . . means of control is
conspicuously lacking.”); cf. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (describing free-
dom from physical incapacitation as a “core” liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause).
23 As Professor Carol Steiker warned well over a decade ago, the near-exclusive focus
on the limits of permissible punishment left “the mistaken impression that if the state is
not punishing, it is not doing anything objectionable at all.”  Carol S. Steiker, Forward, The
Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771, 784 (1998).  For an excel-
lent, recent exploration of the many facets of state-imposed forms of coercive prevention,
see generally PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (Andrew Ashworth, Lucia
Zedner & Patrick Tomlin eds., 2013).
24 A word on scope: This Article focuses on those targeted, preventive, and noncus-
todial measures that are both coercive and predicated on a particularized assessment of the
individual or organization’s likelihood to commit a crime or other bad act—what I call
“pre-crime restraints.” There is an array of other preventive, targeted, and noncustodial
measures that are pre-crime but not restrictive.  One expects, for example, that the FBI will
make pre-crime judgments about who to target for investigations; an investigatory agency
that failed to do so would not be particularly effective.  My focus is on those measures that
cross from tracking and monitoring into restricting and sanctioning.  There also exist a
number of restrictive, preventive (and at times targeted) measures that I do not consider
pre-crime because they are not based on a particular individual’s or entity’s propensity to
commit a particular bad act.  Examples include most health and safety requirements, such
as environmental regulations, general licensing requirements, and mandatory vaccination
laws.
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ered a form of de facto imprisonment.  In most cases, the restraints
are partial rather than total but still significantly diminish the capacity
to make choices central to a meaningful life and stamp their targets as
second-class.25  Permanent restrictions on the ability to fly, for exam-
ple, deny targeted individuals a central mode of transport in modern
life, thereby impeding liberty interests in travel,26 choice of employ-
ment,27 and maintenance of familial and other intimate
connections.28
This Part also highlights a set of concerns common to all pre-
crime restraints, whether custodial or noncustodial—namely, the risk
of error and abuse, the inexorable incentives for expansion, the sin-
gling out of individuals and groups for second-class treatment, and
the failure to respect individuals’ moral autonomy.
In Part III, I argue that while targeted, noncustodial pre-crime
restraints can serve a valid governmental purpose, there must be effec-
tive limits on their use.  Comprehensive restraints that result in
near-total control over an individual’s movement and activities, such
as certain financial sanctions applied to U.S. residents and the most
restrictive limits placed on sex offenders, ought to trigger the same
substantive limits and procedural protections that would apply if the
state were seeking to detain the individual physically.  They could, for
example, operate as discrete gap-fillers (as is allowed with pretrial de-
tention)29 or apply narrowly to those who pose a danger and have an
additional impairment making it difficult, if not impossible, to control
25 This terminology is borrowed from Professor Martha Nussbaum’s work that dis-
cusses the ways in which a state action can lead to total or “partial” imprisonment of its
citizens.  Martha C. Nussbaum, Forward, Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against
Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2007).
26 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) (“Freedom of movement across
frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage.  Travel
abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a livelihood.  It may be as close
to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads.  Freedom of
movement is basic in our scheme of values. . . .  Freedom of movement also has large social
values.”); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630–31 (1969) (describing the funda-
mental right to interstate travel), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
27 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 475–76 (1959) (describing liberty and
property consequences of plaintiff’s chosen field of endeavor being “closed to him”). But
see Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894–96 (1961)
(finding no due process violation where employee of government contractor was denied
access to her place of employment).  The difference in the two cases turns, in part, on the
availability (or lack thereof) of other possible employment opportunities in the field of
one’s choosing.
28 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505–06 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (holding that a city ordinance making it a crime for certain family members to
live in the same household violated substantive due process).
29 This picks up on the argument made by Professor Stephen Schulhofer that “civil
deprivation of liberty is permissible only as a gap-filler, to solve problems that the criminal
process cannot address.”  Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on
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their behavior (as is required for civil commitment of sex offend-
ers).30  They could not, however, operate as broad-based and open-
ended tools for managing risk.  One need not agree with these spe-
cific recommendations, however, to accept the general premise: cer-
tain types of noncustodial, targeted, and preventive restrictions so
dramatically restrict the ability to lead a meaningful life that they
ought to trigger the same substantive scrutiny and procedural protec-
tions that apply to physical incapacitation or other bodily restraints.
Other less extreme (and more common) restraints also warrant
enhanced substantive scrutiny and procedural safeguards given the
often significant liberty interest at stake, the targeted nature and stig-
matizing effect of the restraints, and the risk of error.  Tailored and
adjudicatory restraints, rather than rule-based restraints, ought to be
the norm.
In contrast to the extensive and important literature on various
forms of preventive detention,31 there has been only limited attention
to the various forms of affirmative, preventive, and noncustodial re-
straints that have cropped up in multiple contexts and with minimal
oversight.32  The existing scholarship tends to look at each regime in
the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 85 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (emphasizing “the constitutional
importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment
from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively
through criminal proceedings” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (“A finding of dangerousness, standing
alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary
commitment.”); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82–83 (1992) (rejecting an approach to
civil commitment that would permit the indefinite confinement “of any convicted crimi-
nal” after completion of a prison term).
31 For a sampling of the literature on various forms of preventive detention, see gen-
erally Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Mili-
tary Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008); David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive
Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (2009); Michael Louis Corrado,
Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants, and Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2005); Eric S.
Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually
Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319 (2003); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention,
110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010); Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention
in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 85 (2011); Schulhofer, supra note
29. R
32 This is starting to change, and there is an increasingly extensive body of literature
on sex offender restrictions. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolu-
tion of Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1122
(2012) (arguing that increasingly harsh sex offender registration schemes deprive regis-
trants of liberty interests).  A number of scholars have started to pay attention to the vari-
ous noncustodial preventive restrictions in the national security field. See, e.g., Aaron H.
Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1240 (focusing on the No
Fly List); David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 215–24 (2010)
(addressing terrorism financial sanction regime); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis
Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1613, 1646 (2009) (same).
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isolation, with the predominant argument being that such restraints
should be channeled through the criminal law or categorically prohib-
ited.33  This Article rejects that approach.  Channeling these restraints
through the criminal law does little to set substantive, prospective lim-
its on the use of such restraints given the breadth of substantive crimi-
nal law and weakness of proportionality review, and it ultimately
disserves both the punitive and preventive functions of the law.  Ac-
cepting the need for and legitimacy of certain preventive measures,
this Article develops a framework for setting appropriate substantive
and procedural limits on their future use.
I
PRE-CRIME RESTRAINTS IN OPERATION
The federal government has long had far-reaching authority to
take preventive actions by, for example, revoking a security clearance
in response to a perceived threat34 or demanding extensive conditions
of pretrial release.35  States also have longstanding and wide-ranging
power to expel a student from school for behavioral reasons,36 to re-
scind employment based on an alleged security breach,37 or to impose
stay-away orders in domestic violence cases.38  These are all forms of
noncustodial pre-crime restraints.  Over the past decade, the number
and scope of such restraints has exploded—mostly in the national se-
curity arena but also on the margins of the criminal justice system.39
33 For a sampling of the literature arguing that pre-crime prevention is actually pun-
ishment in disguise, see Caplan, supra note 32, at 1255–58 (describing No Fly List as R
equivalent to singling out individuals for punishment); Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note
32, at 1117–22; Wayne A. Logan, Populism and Punishment: Sex Offender Registration and Com- R
munity Notification in the Courts, 26 CRIM. JUST. 37, 37–38 (2011); Eric Sandberg-Zakian,
Counterterrorism, the Constitution, and the Civil-Criminal Divide: Evaluating the Designation of
U.S. Persons Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 95, 97
(2011).  One obvious exception is the work of Professor Murphy, discussed supra note 21. R
34 See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 526–30 (1988) (affirming the
Executive Branch’s broad discretion to deny or revoke security clearance pursuant to the
Civil Service Reform Act).
35 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (2012) (granting federal judges broad authority to
impose conditions of release).
36 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)
(noting that “the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehen-
sive authority of the States and of school officials . . . to prescribe and control conduct in
the schools” but finding a First Amendment violation as a result of the particular sanction
imposed).
37 For a controversial example, see Lerner v. Casey.  357 U.S. 468, 474, 478 (1958)
(finding constitutional the dismissal of New York state employee—an alleged communist—
due to security risk).
38 All fifty states authorize civil protection orders in domestic violence cases.  Sally F.
Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse
Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1503 (2008).
39 The obvious historical antecedent is the Jim Crow era, in which a series of noncus-
todial but pervasive restrictions relegated African-Americans to an ostracized underclass.
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This Part provides background on three such regimes—terrorism-re-
lated financial sanctions, the No Fly List, and restrictions imposed on
sex offenders—and examines their purpose and evolution over time.
Primarily descriptive, these examples provide important background
for the analysis and recommendations made in Parts II and III.40
A. Specially Designated Global Terrorists
Within weeks of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W.
Bush announced a plan to “starve” terrorists of funding.41  Citing the
“continuing and immediate threat” of further terrorist acts, he in-
voked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 197742
and issued an Executive Order (the “SDGT Order”) that blocked the
property of twenty-seven named individuals and organizations.43  As-
sets of these “Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” or “SDGTs,” as
they have come to be known, were immediately frozen.44
Because money is fungible, both the scope of restrictions and cat-
egories of persons and entities subject to such restrictions are inten-
tionally broad.  The SDGT Order prohibits “U.S. persons”—a term
that covers U.S.-based entities, citizens, and residents—from provid-
ing any financial or in-kind support to the designated entities, irre-
spective of the purpose of the support.  Financial support intended
for the purchase of bomb-making tools and donations earmarked for
humanitarian relief projects are equally banned.  Violators are subject
to civil and criminal penalties and themselves qualify for inclusion on
the list due to their support of listed SDGTs.45
The myth of “separate but equal” was eventually chipped away through a series of Supreme
Court rulings based on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.  For a powerful argument that the racial caste system is reemerg-
ing in a new form, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 139–40 (2010) (describing the combined effect of a series of
noncustodial restraints imposed on convicted felons).
40 While this Article focuses on the United States’ statutory framework for and consti-
tutional limits to the explosion of noncustodial pre-crime restraints, there are important
parallels to a range of other noncustodial targeted restraints imposed by other nations and
international bodies.  Examples include control orders in the United Kingdom (replaced
in 2011 by “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures”) and United Na-
tions–imposed terrorism-related financial sanctions. See, e.g., A v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 3455/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) (addressing control orders and use of classified evi-
dence); infra note 51 (briefly discussing international terrorism-sanction regimes).  I in- R
tend to pursue a comparative analysis in future work.
41 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet on Terrorist Fi-
nancing Executive Order (Sept. 24, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse
.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-2.html (cautioning that “this is historical
material, ‘frozen in time’” and that “[t]he web site is no longer updated and links to exter-
nal web sites and some internal pages will not work”).
42 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2012).
43 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,080 (Sept. 23, 2001).
44 Id.
45 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702, 1705; Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,080.
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The SDGT Order also gives the Secretaries of State and Treasury
broad authority to add additional persons and entities to the list.  Per-
sons who “pose a significant risk” of committing acts of terrorism,46
provide financial or other material support or services to listed per-
sons or entities, or are “otherwise associated with”47 listed persons
meet the criteria for inclusion.48  Within a year, the SDGT list in-
cluded more than one hundred entities and individuals.  By 2006, 375
entities and individuals were so designated,49 and as of December
2012, 731 entities and individuals were on the list.50  Many of these
individuals and entities are also subject to separate United Na-
tions–imposed sanctions and associated travel bans—often at the be-
hest of the United States.51
The use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act as
a counterterrorism tool is not new: it has its roots in 1995 when Presi-
dent Clinton issued an Executive Order blocking the assets of twelve
named persons who were said to “threaten to disrupt the Middle East
peace process” and giving the Secretaries of Treasury and State the
authority to list additional individuals or entities.52  The post-9/11 use
46 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079–80.
47 The term “otherwise associated with” was not defined by regulations until January
25, 2007, after a district court in California ruled that the term was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. See Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 463 F.
Supp. 2d 1049, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2006).  The regulation defines “otherwise associated with”
as “(a) To own or control; or (b) To attempt, or to conspire with one or more persons, to
act for or on behalf of or to provide financial, material, or technological support, or finan-
cial or other services, to.” 31 C.F.R. § 594.316 (2013).  The Central District of California
later held that the regulation cured the vagueness and overbreadth problem.  Humanita-
rian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1104–07 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
48 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,080; see also id. at 49,079 (listing addi-
tional criteria for designation).
49 Humanitarian Law Project, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
50 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 13, at 5. R
51 See, e.g., Vanessa Baehr-Jones, Mission Possible: How Intelligence Evidence Rules Can
Save UN Terrorist Sanctions, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 447, 467 (2011) (describing interplay
between the United States’ and United Nations’ terrorism financial sanction regimes).  As
the Treasury Department describes it:
Designati[on] . . . exposes and isolates these individuals and organizations,
denies them access to the U.S. financial system, and, in the case of a UN
designation, the global financial system as well.  Furthermore, banks and
other private institutions around the world frequently consult OFAC’s SDN
list and report denying listed persons access to their institutions.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 13, at 6. R
52 Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079, 5079–80 (Jan. 23, 1995).  Until 1995,
the International Emergency Economics Act (IEEPA) had been used to impose sanctions
on specific states and their nationals.  50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2012).  In Executive Order
12,947, President Clinton targeted for the first time named individuals and entities based
not on their nationality but on their specific history of committing and propensity to com-
mit specified bad acts.  Later that year, he did the same with respect to certain “significant
foreign narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia.”  Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg.
54,579, 54,579 (Oct. 21, 1995).  For an excellent description of IEEPA’s history as well as
an argument that the use of IEEPA to focus on individuals and nonstate actors is ultra
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of the Act, however, has exploded in terms of numbers and scope.53
First, in a break from the Clinton-era orders, the Bush-era SDGT Or-
der makes provision of material support or services to listed persons a
ground for designation, without any requirement that the specific
support or services are aimed at violence or terrorism.  A person or
entity could be designated for supporting a listed organization even if
the support had an innocent purpose.54  Second, within weeks of the
SDGT Order’s issuance, Congress amended the underlying statute to
allow an asset freeze and other restrictions to be applied during the
investigatory stage (a “block pending investigation”) even before there
had been any designation determination, without specifying how long
the freeze could remain in place.55  In at least one case, the Treasury
Department maintained a block pending investigation for twenty
months before a federal district court stepped in and enjoined the
government from taking further action to preserve the status quo.56
Third, Congress amended the underlying statute to approve the use
vires, see Laura K. Donohue, Constitutional and Legal Challenges to the Anti-Terrorist Finance
Regime, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 686–90 (2008). But see Humanitarian Law Project v.
U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 578 F.3d 1133, 1148–51 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the ultra vires
argument).
53 As of December 2012, thirty-eight individuals and entities were designated as “Spe-
cially Designated Terrorists” under the Clinton-era terrorism-related orders, as compared
to the over 700 individuals and entities designated as SDGTs pursuant to the 2001 designa-
tion process. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 13, at 5. R
54 Intentional provision of support to a SDGT is a criminal law violation even if sup-
port is in the form of humanitarian aid. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012).  The same is true of
support to foreign terrorist organizations designated under the parallel State Depart-
ment–led designation process. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012); Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2721–22, 2729–31 (2010) (rejecting First and Fifth Amendment
challenges to the criminal prohibitions on provision of training, services, expert advice,
and personnel to designated terrorist organizations).  Criminal defendants and derivative
listees are prohibited from collaterally attacking the underlying designation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that de-
fendants charged with assisting terrorist organizations could not collaterally attack the des-
ignation). But see United States v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915, 920–21 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (contesting the notion that defendants can lawfully be prohibited from chal-
lenging an underlying designation); see also David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The
Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 147, 151–56 (2012) (providing excellent analysis of the Humanitarian Law Project case
and its broader implications).
55 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title
I, § 106, 115 Stat. 272, 277 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2012)); see also JOHN
ROTH ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., MONOGRAPH ON TER-
RORIST FINANCING 99, 112 (2004) (describing a block pending investigation as requiring
just a “single” piece of paper signed by the Director of OFAC but noting that the decision
was usually discussed and agreed to in an interagency process).
56 See KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d
857, 870 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 2009).  The assets of Al-Haramain and Global Relief Fund were
blocked pending investigation for seven and eleven months, respectively. See Al-Haramain
Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 986 (9th Cir. 2012); Global
Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 2002).
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of classified information as a basis for the designation determination
and to protect its use from disclosure in any subsequent judicial
proceeding.57
While the vast majority of the 700-plus listed entities and individu-
als is foreign, at least twelve U.S.-based entities and four U.S. citizens
have been listed.58  For a domestic organization, a blocking order
leads to the effective shuttering of its operations.59  Assets and prop-
erty of the entity are immediately frozen, the entity cannot engage in
any transactions, and U.S. persons and residents are prohibited from
providing any goods or services to the entity.  As the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit summarized in 2012, “designation is not a mere
inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation
indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct.”60
Moreover, even if an organization is eventually delisted or a block
pending investigation is lifted, it can be difficult for the targeted entity
to access their own frozen assets.61
For listed individuals residing in the United States, the effect is
draconian.  Designation effectively bars them from participating in
the society in which they live but for the beneficial and discretionary
modifications granted by the federal government.  Listed individuals
cannot buy groceries, receive medical care, or engage in a single fi-
nancial transaction without a license from the Treasury Department.
57 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2012), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title I, § 106, 115 Stat.
at 277–78 (“In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the deter-
mination was based on classified information . . . such information may be submitted to the
reviewing court ex parte and in camera.”).
58 This tally counts both the SGDT and the related Specially Designated Terrorist
(SDT) list and includes three entities and three individuals no longer included on the list:
Salah Mohammad Salah (delisted on November 5, 2012, after having been labeled a SDT
for seventeen years), KindHearts (dissolved in 2012 pursuant to a settlement agreement),
Anwar al-Aulaqi (reportedly killed by drone strike in Yemen in September 2011), Garad
Nor (delisted August 27, 2002), Global Services International, Inc. (an entity delisted Au-
gust 27, 2002), and Aaran Money Wire Service, Inc. (same). See Aaran Money Wire Serv.,
Inc. v. United States, No. 02CV789JMR/FLN, 2003 WL 22143735, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 21,
2003); Anti-Terrorism Designations; Anti-Terrorism Designations Removal, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-En
forcement/Pages/20121105.aspx.
59 See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 686 F.3d at 979 (noting that designation
“completely shutters all domestic operations”); Global Relief Found., Inc., 315 F.3d at 751
(describing a blocking order as forcing an entity to “effectively shut down its operations
across the globe”); KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (stating that blocking orders “effec-
tively shut the organization down”); see also Sandberg-Zakian, supra note 33, at 95–96 R
(describing how designation destroyed Global Relief and other American-Islamic
charities).
60 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 686 F.3d at 980.
61 See, e.g., Status Report at 1–2, KindHearts v. Geithner, No. 3:08-cv-2400 (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 20, 2013) (describing difficulties in obtaining disbursement of previously blocked
funds).
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They cannot even accept gifts in lieu of payment.62  They are subject
to near-total, albeit indirect, government control over their daily
activities.63
Despite these dramatic consequences, the restrictions are
deemed preventive rather than punitive, civil rather than criminal.  As
a result, criminal law procedural protections do not apply.  There is
no independent adjudicator, no arraignment where the individual or
entity is formally informed of the charges, no requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, no opportunity to cross-examine one’s
accusers, and no chance to obtain and respond to all of the evidence
presented to the fact finder.64  Even the less onerous procedural
rights in a civil forfeiture case (including the right to conduct discov-
ery, the presence of an independent adjudicator, and the require-
ment of proof based on a preponderance of the evidence) are not
deemed applicable on the theory that property is not formally
divested from its owner but merely subject to a temporary, albeit in-
definite, freeze.65  And because a freeze of assets does not involve
physical incapacitation, none of the procedural protections (includ-
ing a clear and convincing evidentiary standard and hearings before
an independent adjudicator) that apply to civil commitment are
triggered.66
Rather, designation determinations are made solely within the
Executive Branch, with Treasury and State Department officials acting
as the functional prosecutor, fact finder, and review board.67  In some
62 See 31 C.F.R. § 594 (2013) (implementing SDGT sanction regime).
63 See, e.g., ROTH ET AL., supra note 55, at 81 (describing a U.S. citizen subject to a R
blocking order who was placed for five months in the “unenviable choice of starving or
being in criminal violation of the OFAC blocking order” until a lawsuit prompted the
United States to issue him a license “to allow him to get sufficient money to live”).  Discre-
tionary government relief can come with so many strings attached as to make it noneffec-
tive: Mohammad Salah, a designated SDT, was granted a license to work and pay for
“normal living . . . expenses,” but the license required that income be deposited in a bank
account and imposed such onerous reporting requirements that the only bank willing to
open such an account closed it after three years.  Complaint at 8–9, Salah v. U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, No. 1:12-cv-07067 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2012).  While the impact on
foreign-based entities and individuals is less extreme, such entities and individuals often
find themselves subject to United Nations and other foreign partner–imposed sanction
regimes and travel bans as well, usually at the United States’ behest. See supra note 13. R
64 For an argument that these restrictions should be deemed punitive, at least when
applied to U.S. persons, see Sandberg-Zakian, supra note 33, at 97. R
65 See ROTH ET AL., supra note 55, at 50–51 (“[W]hen a freeze separates the owner R
from his or her money for dozens of years, [the difference between an IEEPA freeze and
civil forfeiture order] is a distinction without a difference.”).
66 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012) (permitting the blocking of an organization’s assets as
soon as an organization is designated as a foreign terrorist organization, without providing
any mechanism for independent review).
67 Id. (authorizing the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury and Attorney General, to “designate an organization as a foreign terrorist
organization”).
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cases, entities and individuals have been notified via publication on
the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) website or via press re-
lease.68  While U.S.-based entities are entitled to an opportunity to re-
view the unclassified record,69 there is no right to any sort of
administrative hearing at which the entity or individual may cross-ex-
amine its accusers.  Entities and individuals must apply for licenses
just to obtain the services of an attorney.70
Court review is post hoc, based solely on a record compiled by the
Executive Branch and extremely deferential.  The courts require little
more than a “reasonable relation” between the facts in the record and
the designation determination,71 and even probative information that
has come to light after the record has been closed generally will not
be considered.72  Reviewing courts have repeatedly emphasized the
“extreme” deference due to the Executive Branch given that the ter-
rorist finance designations operate at the “intersection of national se-
curity, foreign policy, and administrative law.”73  The deference
extends to both the Executive’s fact finding and the nature and scope
of the designation scheme itself.  It is what I call an Executive
Branch–imposed, individualized restraint, with comprehensive effect.
To the extent courts have pushed back, they have focused prima-
rily on procedural rights and thus have left the overall scheme intact.
In Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Treasury, for example, the Ninth
68 See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 686 F.3d
965, 973 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that no prior notice was provided to Al-Haramain before
its assets were blocked and a press statement was issued); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp.
2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2008) (describing plaintiff as being “made aware of his designation by a
Department of the Treasury press release posted on the Internet”).
69 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 686 F.3d at 982–84, 1001; KindHearts for Charita-
ble Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 905 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
70 31 C.F.R. § 595.506 (2013); see also KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 916 (finding that
OFAC’s refusal to allow entity to use blocked funds to pay attorney fees was arbitrary and
capricious).
71 Two courts have also ruled that probable cause is required to support the initial
designation decision. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 686 F.3d at 993; KindHearts, 647 F.
Supp. 2d at 881–82.  These rulings also suggest—but do not conclusively require—that the
government either provide the designated entity or individual unclassified summaries of
any classified evidence relied upon or allow cleared counsel to review it.  That said, at least
one district court has since concluded that “OFAC has no obligation to offer unclassified
summaries or access to cleared counsel” and that alternative “mitigation measures” could
suffice.  Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 3:07-CV-01155,
2012 WL 6203136, at *10 (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2012); see also Holy Land Found. for Relief &
Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting argument that government
should be prohibited from relying on classified evidence and failing to impose any disclo-
sure obligations).
72 See, e.g., Kadi v. Geithner, No. 09-0108, 2012 WL 898778, at *11 (D.D.C Mar. 19,
2012) (refusing to consider a corrected document since the correction postdated the
agency’s decision and was therefore not part of the record).
73 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 686 F.3d at 979 (quoting Islamic Am. Relief
Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); see Kadi, 2012 WL 898778, at *6.
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Circuit concluded that the government violated an Oregon-based en-
tity’s due process rights by failing to provide over a span of four years
the reasons for its designation.74  It also ruled that the government
violated the entity’s Fourth Amendment rights by failing to obtain a
warrant before seizing its assets.  But ultimately the court found both
errors harmless.75  Going forward, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling obliges
the government to obtain a warrant before seizing an entity’s assets; to
provide a “terse and complete statement of [the] reasons” for designa-
tion, although even that requirement can be waived based on a show-
ing of undue burden;76 and to make available unclassified summaries
of the classified information relied upon, provide a mechanism by
which cleared counsel could review the classified information, or ade-
quately defend their failure to do so (presumably on national security
grounds).77  As long as these basic procedural requirements are met,
the deferential standard of review applies.78  Thus, the broad designa-
tion criteria, expansive set of restrictions, and administrative fact-find-
ing process are left largely unchecked.  Entities and individuals can
still be effectively shut down based merely on a probable cause or rea-
sonable basis finding by the Executive Branch, without any indepen-
dent, de novo court review.79
74 The court found that “[i]n the entire four-year period, only one document could
be viewed as supplying some reasons for OFAC’s investigation and designation decision.”
686 F.3d at 985.  As a result, Al-Haramain was forced to guess at the reason for designation:
“Some of those guesses ended up being correct . . . and some of those guesses ended up
being incorrect.” Id.
75 Id. at 995 (concluding that “no exception applies to OFAC’s warrantless seizure of
AHIF-Oregon’s assets and the seizure is not justified under a ‘general reasonableness’
test”).  The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded, however, that the due process error was
harmless and remanded to determine what, “if any,” remedy was required in response to
the Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 1001.  On remand, Al-Haramain conceded that
the Fourth Amendment violation was harmless given the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the
administrative record supported designation. Al-Haramain, 2012 WL 6203136, at *6–7.
The Ninth Circuit also separately concluded that the prohibition on coordinated advocacy
with Al-Haramain violated the First Amendment. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 686 F.3d
at 1001.
76 Id. at 986.
77 Id. at 983 (recognizing that “disclosure may not always be possible” but emphasiz-
ing that “[i]n many cases . . . some information could be summarized or presented to a
lawyer with a security clearance without implicating national security” and putting the bur-
den on the government to “defend[ ]” the failure to do so).
78 Id. at 979 (reiterating “that our review—in an area at the intersection of national
security, foreign policy, and administrative law—is extremely deferential” (quoting Islamic
Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
79 As of this writing, I am aware of only one other case in which the court has found
that the designation process violated an entity’s constitutional rights.  In KindHearts, as in
Al-Haramain, a district court found a due process and Fourth Amendment violation but
rejected other challenges to the designation scheme itself.  KindHearts for Charitable Hu-
manitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 919 (N.D. Ohio 2009).  The case
ultimately settled in November 2011, but it was in many ways a Pyrrhic victory: KindHearts
agreed to dissolve itself in exchange for being permitted to spend its frozen assets and for
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For scholars like Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule,
such deference—particularly in the immediate wake of the 9/11 at-
tacks—is both inevitable and beneficial.80  In a 2009 article, Posner
and Vermeule describe the Executive asserting broad power to re-
spond to a crisis and the legislature and courts invariably acquiescing
to a significant degree.81  They further posit that once the crisis
passes, “legality and legitimacy will once again pull in tandem; courts
then have more freedom to invalidate emergency measures, but it is
less important whether or not they do so, as the emergency measure
will in large part have already worked, or not.”82
But this analysis discounts the ways in which these “emergency”
measures become embedded into the legal framework, and the nor-
mative implications are troubling.  Once the immediate crisis has
passed, courts are, as Posner and Vermeule suggest, more likely to
engage.  But, with some notable exceptions,83 courts tend to push on
the edges only, emphasizing process-based rights while leaving broad
policies in place.84  Thus, what starts out as emergency lawmaking
often becomes institutionalized.  This is a disturbing state of affairs.
Once the crisis passes, it is critically important that courts, as well as
being delisted. See Settlement Agreement, KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev.,
Inc. v. Geithner, available at www.aclu.org/files/assets/kindhearts_v__geithner_-_settle
ment.pdf.
80 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1679. R
81 Id. at 1656.  Others have made a similar point about the tendency of the Executive
to amass power in the wake of an emergency, albeit applying a very different normative
lens. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 12–13, 527–30
(2004) (describing leaders as exploiting public fears in times of crisis, resulting in excessive
sacrifice of civil liberties); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029,
1032–37 (2004) (describing Americans as succumbing to the “paranoid style of political
leadership” after 9/11).  For an argument that courts do in fact push back to protect liber-
ties, even during times of crisis, see David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review
and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2571–84 (2004).
82 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1659–60. R
83 A quadruplet of Supreme Court post-9/11 cases comprise a noteworthy repudia-
tion of the Executive’s “emergency” detention and trial policies. See Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008) (holding that denial of habeas corpus to Guantanamo Bay detain-
ees violated the Suspension Clause); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 (2006) (de-
claring unlawful the military commissions created by Executive Order); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (requiring that citizen-detainees be provided a “mean-
ingful opportunity” to challenge the basis of detention and concluding that had not taken
place in petitioner’s case); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478–79 (2004) (holding that statu-
tory writ of habeas corpus applied to Guantanamo Bay detainees).  But as Posner and
Vermeule point out, even these cases focused primarily on process rights, failed to order
the release of any petitioner, and, at least in the case of Hamdi, broadly affirmed the Execu-
tive Branch’s asserted authority to detain pursuant to the 2001 Authorization to Use Mili-
tary Force.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1618–19. R
84 Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1617–19 (discussing how courts “reassert R
themselves, at least symbolically” in the aftermath of a crisis but noting that there are
“sharp pragmatic limits on what courts are willing to do when faced with executive claims
of security needs”).
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legislators, take a hard look at emergency measures—particularly
those that that impose targeted, affirmative restraints.85  With respect
to the financial sanction regime, review has focused almost exclusively
on procedural issues, with little in the way of substantive limit setting.
B. No Fly List
The No Fly List has the purpose of preventing would-be terrorists
from using airplanes as weapons or otherwise threatening the safety of
other passengers on board.  Persons on the No Fly List are prohibited
from boarding a U.S.-based air carrier or any plane transiting through
the United States or over U.S. airspace.86
At the time of the 9/11 attacks, the precursor to the No Fly List
had just twelve names on it.87  As of February 2012, the List reportedly
included 21,000 names, including approximately 500 U.S. citizens.88
In several instances, U.S. citizens and long-time U.S. residents have
been prohibited from flying home to the United States, presumably
85 Posner and Vermeule’s equanimity may stem from the way in which they approach
the problem.  In describing the Executive’s response to the 2009 financial meltdown and
the 2001 terrorist attacks as part of the same phenomenon, they gloss over the key distinc-
tion between the two: in 2009, the Executive responded with a targeted infusion of govern-
ment assistance, whereas in 2001, the Executive responded by targeting individuals and
entities for sanction.  While it may be both appropriate and advantageous that courts defer
to the Executive’s assessment of how best to allocate discretionary financing—and, in fact,
Posner and Vermeule point to the destabilizing market effect of having courts second-
guess those determinations, see id. at 1658—government interventions that impose
targeted, affirmative restraints can have long-standing consequences for individual liberty
interests and warrant enhanced scrutiny as a result. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 32, at 242 R
(describing and lauding Treasury’s ability to bypass ossifying constraints of administrative
law but warning that this “sort of independence is problematic when civil liberties are at
stake,” as exemplified by the IEEPA sanction regime).
86 MAUREEN COONEY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT ON EFFECTS ON PRIVACY
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 2–3 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/
privacy_rpt_nofly.pdf.
87 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION RE-
PORT 83 (2004) (“[A]s of 9/11, the FAA’s ‘no-fly’ list contained the names of just 12 terror-
ist suspects . . . .”).
88 See Cratty, supra note 20; Sullivan, supra note 18.  According to a 2012 GAO report, R
the number of U.S. persons—defined as citizens and legal permanent residents—“more
than doubled” after the December 2009 attempted attack on an airliner headed toward
Minneapolis. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-476, TERRORIST WATCHLIST:
ROUTINELY ASSESSING IMPACTS OF AGENCY ACTIONS SINCE THE DECEMBER 25, 2009, AT-
TEMPTED ATTACK COULD HELP INFORM FUTURE EFFORTS 14 (2012), available at http://www
.gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf.  An earlier report from the DOJ Inspector General de-
scribes the list as having over 71,000 “records” in July 2006, although a review led to a
reduction to approximately 34,000 by the end of 2007; it is unclear whether there is a one-
to-one correlation between records and individuals on the list or whether a single individ-
ual might have been described in several records. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV., AUDIT REPORT 07-41, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST
SCREENING CENTER, at xiii (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/
a0741/final.pdf [hereinafter DOJ 2007 AUDIT].  The United States does not officially dis-
close the number of people on the list.
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because of their inclusion on the List.89  Others are barred from trav-
eling by plane to go on business trips or to visit loved ones far away.
Like the financial sanction regime, it is an Executive
Branch–imposed, particularized restraint, notable because of the ex-
treme level of secrecy.
The United States refuses to confirm or deny whether specific
individuals are on the No Fly List, even to those who show up at an
airport with a ticket in hand and are told they cannot board their
scheduled flight.90  The Deputy Director of Operations of the Terror-
ist Screening Center, which maintains the No Fly List, warned in a
2010 court filing that disclosure could result in targeted individuals
and associated terrorist groups taking steps to “avoid future detection,
destroy evidence, coerce witnesses, change plans from what is known
by law enforcement or intelligence agencies, . . . recruit new mem-
bers[,] . . . or circumvent enhanced airline or border screening proce-
dures.”91  This is claimed to hold true even if the individual has
already attempted to board a plane and been prohibited from doing
so.  To date, no court has ordered disclosure.92
89 See, e.g., Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-CV-00750-BR, 2013 WL 4592515, at *3–6 (D. Or.
Aug. 28, 2013) (describing experiences of thirteen U.S. citizens denied boarding on planes
traveling over U.S. airspace); Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-00050-(AJT/TRJ), 2011 WL
3820711, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2011) (alleging that Kuwait had been unable to return
plaintiff to the United States because of his placement on the No Fly List); Second
Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 4, Latif v. Holder, No. 10-CV-
750-BR, 2011 WL 1667471 (D. Or. May 3, 2011) (providing additional details on the diffi-
culties plaintiffs had in returning to the United States because of their alleged placement
on the No Fly List); Finn, supra note 17 (discussing the facts behind the Mohamed v. Holder R
litigation).
90 Latif, 2013 WL 4592515, at *3 (explaining that an individual prohibited from
boarding an airplane is not at any point during the administrative grievance process told
whether or not he or she is on the No Fly List or in the broader Terrorist Screening
Database).  While maintenance of the No Fly List or its functional equivalent is mandated
by Congress, the specifics in terms of design and implementation are a matter of executive
discretion. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 114(h) (2012) (requiring that the Transportation Security
Administration, a subset of the Department of Transportation, identify individuals “who
may be a threat to civil aviation or national security” and “prevent the individual from
boarding an aircraft, or take other appropriate action with respect to that individual” but
failing to define the threat standard or any other specifics about the initiative).
91 Declaration of Christopher Piehota at 12–13, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR
(D. Or. Nov. 17, 2010).  The website of the Terrorism Screening Center, the organization
that maintains the No Fly List, similarly asserts that “[d]isclosure of [No Fly List] informa-
tion would tip off known or suspected terrorists, who could then change their habits or
identities to escape government scrutiny.”  It also fails to differentiate those persons who
have no reason to believe they are on the List and those who have shown up at an airport
and have been told they cannot board their flight. See Terrorist Screening Center Frequently
Asked Questions, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/tsc_faqs (last visited Nov. 25,
2013).
92 See, e.g., Scherfen v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:CV-08-1554, 2010 WL
456784, at *8 n.5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2010) (accepting without analysis the government’s
assertion that plaintiffs’ watch-list status—of which the No Fly List is a subset—cannot be
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 20 10-JAN-14 11:17
346 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:327
Even the criteria for placement on the No Fly List are deemed
“sensitive security information”—meaning that the criteria cannot be
publicly disclosed, including to those who have been prohibited from
boarding a plane.93  In publicly released documents, government offi-
cials describe the No Fly List as a subset of the government’s broader
database of “known or suspected terrorists”94 but do not state what
constitutes a “known or suspected terrorist,” let alone the additional
criteria required for inclusion on the No Fly List.  Whatever the crite-
ria, a “reasonable suspicion” standard applies.95
An individual who has been denied boarding is told to fill out a
complaint through the Department of Homeland Security’s Travel
Redress Inquiry Program.  But the individual must guess as to whether
he or she is in fact on a No Fly List, what the criteria are for inclusion,
and what the factual bases are for determining that the individual
meets those criteria.  An internal review then follows.  At the conclu-
sion of the process, the individual is issued a letter saying either: “we
can neither confirm nor deny any information about you which may
be within federal watchlists” and that “[t]his letter constitutes our final
agency decision;”96 or “no changes or corrections are warranted at
this time” and the decision will be final in thirty days unless the indi-
vidual files an administrative appeal within that time.97  Both letters
disclosed and offering to write a separate opinion that “will be unavailable for inspection
by the public or by [p]laintiffs or their counsel” to address the underlying factual issues).
93 See, e.g., Latif, 2013 WL 4592515, at *2 (“The federal government does not release
its minimum, substantive, derogatory criteria for placement on the No Fly List nor the
‘Watchlisting Guidance’ created for internal use by intelligence and law-enforcement com-
munities.”); 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5 (2013) (defining sensitive security information);  Def. Mot.
to Dismiss, Latif v. Holder, supra note 17, at 8–11 (asserting that the No Fly and Selectee R
criteria are “sensitive security information” and are therefore protected from public
release).
94 See Declaration of Christopher Piehota, supra note 91, at 3. R
95 Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1125 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012).  Internal audits also have
revealed a number of quality control problems with both the No Fly List and the underly-
ing database of known or suspected terrorists. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
669 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing errors and misidentifications associated with
the No Fly List and underlying databases); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., AUDIT DIV., AUDIT REPORT 09-25, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST
WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES 36, 41 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/
reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf (finding that the FBI improperly failed to remove individuals
from the underlying database of known or suspected terrorists in 8% of cases and made
untimely removals of others); DOJ 2007 AUDIT, supra note 88, at 31, 34–35 (finding high R
rate of errors and inconsistencies in underlying databases of known or suspected ter-
rorists); id. at 33 n.50 (describing database management difficulties causing individuals
inappropriately being included on the No Fly List for up to nine months).
96 Latif, 686 F.3d at 1126.  According to a Department of Justice Inspector General
report, approximately 45% of 310 records reviewed pursuant to redress procedures be-
tween 2005 and 2007 were either modified or removed entirely from the No Fly and re-
lated selectee lists. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 95, at R
52.
97 Latif, 686 F.3d at 1126.
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also inform the recipient that he or she can appeal a final agency deci-
sion to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or the circuit
court where the individual resides.98  By design, the letters do not re-
veal whether the individual is or was ever on the No Fly List or
whether he or she will be permitted to fly in the future.99
In August 2013, an Oregon district court concluded that the No
Fly List—at least applied to plaintiffs who wished to travel internation-
ally—violated their constitutionally protected interest in international
air travel, but it deferred a final ruling as to the underlying procedural
due process claim.  Notably, the court rejected the government’s as-
sertion that there was no liberty interest at stake, because, in the gov-
ernment’s words, there is “no right to . . . the most convenient means
of travel.”100  In evaluating the risk of erroneous deprivation, the
court emphasized that the plaintiffs were never provided any informa-
tion about why they were prohibited from boarding flights, never told
whether they are in fact on the No Fly List, and never provided an
opportunity to contest their placement on the List.  Ultimately, how-
ever, the court decided it could not adjudicate the adequacy of the
procedures provided until it learned more about the separate statuto-
rily established circuit court review process.101  It thus deferred final
ruling on the procedural due process claim.
As a subsequent court filing makes clear, however, the circuit
court review process is hardly sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard that the Oregon
98 Citing 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2006), the government has argued that litigants are
obliged to bring substantive and procedural due process challenges to the No Fly List in
either the D.C. Court of Appeals or the Court of Appeals where they reside. See, e.g., Latif,
686 F.3d at 1126 (quoting federal agency’s letter to plaintiffs indicating that “[f]inal deter-
minations are reviewable by the United States Court of Appeals pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
§ 46110”).  Two Ninth Circuit panels have rejected that claim, allowing suits to proceed in
district court. Id. at 1127; Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1255 (9th
Cir. 2008).  Other courts, however, have mandated that challenges to the No Fly List and
related selectee lists be brought exclusively in the Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Mohamed v.
Holder, No. 1:11-cv-00050-(AJT/TRJ), 2011 WL 3820711, at *5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2011)
(concluding that the Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over TSA letters under 49
U.S.C. § 46110); Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1123 (W.D. Wash.
2005) (same).  No circuit court has yet ruled on such a challenge, although as of this
writing, there are three cases pending. See Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-CV-00750-BR, 2013 WL
4592515, at *13 (D. Or. Aug. 28, 2013).
99 See Latif v. Holder, 2013 WL 4592515, at *3 (“[A]t no point in the available admin-
istrative process is a complainant told whether he or she is in the or a subset of the TSDB
[Terrorist Screening Database] or given any explanation for his or her inclusion on such a
list.”).
100 Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Latif v. Holder, supra note 17, at 24–25. R
101 Id. at 8–9 (concluding that placement on the No Fly List “severely restrict[s]” the
ability to travel internationally, emphasizing the importance of international travel in the
“modern world,” and rejecting the government’s assertion that there is no right to the
most convenient means of travel).
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district court rightly identified as essential.102  The litigants’ joint stip-
ulation of facts establishes that even at the circuit court review stage,
the government does not inform the petitioners whether or not they
are on the No Fly List, the government’s reason for including individ-
uals on the List, or any of the underlying information or evidence
relied on in making the List.103  The circuit court review is thus based
on an ex parte review of the administrative record; those challenging
their placement on the list are granted access to only those portions of
the record that they themselves had submitted.104
No other court has reached the substantive merits of a No Fly List
challenge, due in part to confusion over the appropriate forum for
challenging the No Fly List.  Cases have bounced back and forth be-
tween district and appellate courts, with litigants arguing about what
court the case belongs in and whether individuals have standing to
sue.105  In Part III, I outline the approach that reviewing courts ought
to apply.
C. Sex Offender Residential, Employment, and Related
Restrictions
All fifty states have in place some form of what are commonly
referred to as Megan’s Laws—laws that impose a variety of reporting,
residential, employment, and other similar restrictions on persons
convicted of a wide array of sex and other related offenses.106  The
specifics vary from state to state, but the general impetus and trend
are consistent: they are intended to protect children and other inno-
cent victims from dangerous sexual predators, and they have grown
more onerous and all-encompassing over time.  What started out as
registration requirements for small classes of sex offenders have ex-
panded to include those convicted of a vast category of offenses, in-
cluding consensual sex between teenagers (defined as statutory rape),
a range of other offenses committed by juveniles, and offenses that do
not involve sexual activity or motivation, such as public urination.107
102 Id. at *10.
103 Third Joint Statement of Stipulated Facts at 3, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR
(D. Or. Sept. 30, 2013).
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., Latif, 686 F.3d at 1126–27 (discussing procedural history to No Fly List
challenge); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2012)
(same).
106 The name is based on the registration law first passed by New Jersey in response to
the 1994 abduction, sexual assault, and murder of a girl named Megan Kanka by a con-
victed sex offender. See Megan’s Law by State, KLAAS KIDS FOUND. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://
www.klaaskids.org/meganslaw/.
107 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RAISED ON THE REGISTRY: THE IRREPARABLE HARM OF
PLACING CHILDREN ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES IN THE US, 15–20, 37–38, 62–63 (2013)
(describing incorporation of juveniles into the registries and detailing stories of juveniles
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Federal law now requires, as a condition of receiving certain funding,
that states gather and make public detailed information about a wide
category of offenders and conduct in-person verifications of all such
offenders, with the frequency depending on the offense level.108
Over the past several years, a growing number states and munici-
palities have implemented a dizzying array of residential, employ-
ment, and other restrictions on offenders’ activities as well.109  In
Oklahoma, for example, registered sex offenders—a class that ranges
from persons convicted of violent sexual assaults of strangers to those
convicted of indecent exposure110—are prohibited from living with a
minor child; living within 2000 feet of any school, childcare center,
playground, or park;111 loitering within 500 feet of any school, child-
care center, or park;112 working in any capacity with children;113 en-
gaging in ice cream truck vending;114 or living in a residence with
another convicted sex offender.115  In July 2012, a change in the defi-
nition of “residence” meant that seventy men who had been living in a
mobile home community in Oklahoma City, where they received
church-provided rehabilitation and other services, were forced to
compelled to register because of, among other things, consensual sex engaged in as mi-
nors); CHRYSANTHI S. LEON, SEX FIENDS, PERVERTS, AND PEDOPHILES: UNDERSTANDING SEX
CRIME POLICY IN AMERICA 117 (2011) (describing evolution of sex offender laws over time);
Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 32, at 1076 (same).  For a description of a typical evolu- R
tion in state law, see Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 374–77 (Ind. 2009) (describing the
imposition of residential restrictions in Indiana and the ways in which the number of trig-
gering offenses, duration, and notification requirements have increased over time).
108 In-person verification is required every three, six, or twelve months depending on
the offense level. See The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) § 116,
42 U.S.C. § 16916 (2012); see also id. § 16911 (defining class of individuals subject to report-
ing requirements to include certain juveniles and those convicted of kidnapping and false
imprisonment of minors even if there was no sexual abuse or sexual motivation); id.
§ 16915 (establishing duration of reporting period as lasting fifteen years to life, depend-
ing on the offense level); United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2502 (2013) (up-
holding application of SORNA to members of the military, including those who had
completed their sentence prior to SORNA’s enactment); The National Guidelines for Sex
Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030, 38,030–70 (July 2, 2008)
(obliging states to post extensive information about sex offenders).
109 This is a rapidly evolving area of law, with new initiatives being proposed across the
country and court challenges to such restrictions pending in many jurisdictions.  This sub-
part is not meant to provide an authoritative description of each and every development
but to illustrate the general trends and highlight some of the notable initiatives and court
rulings.
110 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 § 582 (West 2012) (listed offenses subject to registration
includes indecent exposure, as defined at id. tit. 21 § 1021).
111 Id. tit. 57 § 590.
112 Id. tit. 21 § 1125.
113 Id. tit. 57 § 589.
114 Id. tit. 21 § 23001.1.
115 Id. tit. 57 § 590.1.
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leave their residence.116  When the church responded by replacing
the trailers with single-person tents, the city asserted a zoning viola-
tion and forced the men off the property.117  Many reportedly had no
place to go.118
These restraints differ in important ways from the terrorism-re-
lated financial sanctions and the No Fly List in that they are imposed
after a criminal conviction; the fact triggering the issuance of the re-
straint has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt before an inde-
pendent adjudicator.  They also differ from the financial sanctions
and No Fly List in that they are undifferentiated and imposed on
broad classes of convicted persons, without any individualized assess-
ment of risk.  But while they are distinguishable in design and imple-
mentation, they share the same, key preventive purpose as the
Executive Branch–imposed, national security–related restraints.  They
are—with a few limited exceptions—imposed as a regulatory matter,
separate and apart from the criminal sentence, with the sole purpose
of preventing, or at least minimizing, the risk of future bad acts.119
Like the terrorism-related financial sanctions and the No Fly List, they
single out particular individuals for enhanced restrictions on what
they can do and where they can go based on an assessment of future
dangerousness.  They are a court-adjudicated, rule-based (undifferen-
tiated) form of pre-crime restraint.
Moreover, while the restraints are motivated by a legitimate con-
cern about the safety of innocent children, they are generally imposed
without any clear assessment of their efficacy or need—often with se-
vere consequences.  While designed to keep children safe from the
unknown pervert, they fail to address the most prevalent form of sex-
ual harm to children—abuse by family members or other adults al-
ready known to their victims.120  Several studies suggest that the laws
may not even be effective at reducing recidivism and may, in some
116 See Juliana Keeping, Dozens of Sex Offenders May Have to Leave Trailer Park Ministry,
NEWSOK (July 2, 2012), http://newsok.com/dozens-of-sex-offenders-may-have-to-leave-
trailer-park-ministry/article/3688988.
117 See Juliana Keeping, Oklahoma City Says Sex Offenders Can’t Live in Tents at Trailer
Park, NEWSOK (July 30, 2012), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-city-says-sex-offenders-cant-
live-in-tents-at-trailer-park/article/3696607.
118 See Keeping, supra note 116. R
119 See Eric S. Janus, The Preventive State, Terrorists and Sexual Predators: Countering the
Threat of a New Outsider Jurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 576 (2004) (describing restrictions
on sexual offenders as an attempt to manage “risk” outside the usual protections of the
Constitution).
120 According to statistics compiled by the Department of Justice, less than seven per-
cent of sex crimes against juveniles are committed by strangers. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 1, 10 (2000).
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cases, even exacerbate recidivism by creating a sense of nothing to
lose.121
Meanwhile, sex offenders have been forced out of jobs, evicted
from their homes, and prevented from entering an array of public
places.122  In 2008, for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court
upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting registered sex offenders
from entering any public park.  The plaintiff was a disabled stroke
victim who wanted to continue his regular outings with his mother to
the local park.123  Several cities in Orange County, California, have
banned convicted sex offenders from entering public parks, beaches,
harbors, or other public spaces—ordinances that are now the subject
of ongoing litigation.  One plaintiff completed his sentence over fif-
teen years ago, subsequently married, and is now raising a family, yet
is still barred from going with them to public parks and beaches.124
While at least one city has repealed the laws in response to the litiga-
tion, others continue to defend them or make moderate adjustments
to allow for case-by-case exemptions.125
121 See, e.g., KRISTEN ZGOBA ET AL., N.J. DEP’T OF CORR., OFFICE OF POLICY & PLANNING,
MEGAN’S LAW: ASSESSING THE PRACTICAL AND MONETARY EFFICACY 1, 32, 39–42 (2008), avail-
able at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/225370.pdf (stating that Megan’s Law is
ineffective at reducing reoffenses); Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without
Function?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 207, 208 (2011) (finding that neither overall rates of sex offenses
nor recidivism rates decline in response to registration and notification requirements); see
also Maia Szalavitz, Registries Don’t Keep Sex Offenders from Restricted Areas, TIME (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://healthland.time.com/2013/02/01/registries-dont-keep-sex-offenders-from-restric
ted-areas/ (describing enforcement difficulties given numbers subject to the restrictions
and scale of the restrictions).  Other studies, however, have found notification and registra-
tion requirements to contribute to an overall decrease in sexual offenses, even if recidivism
rates are unaffected or possibly even increase as a result of these restrictions. See J.J. Pres-
cott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal
Behavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161, 164–65, 192 (2012) (noting that while the result may be an
overall decrease in sex crimes, recidivism rates may increase as a result of notification laws).
122 Georgia, for example, makes it a felony for a sex offender to loiter in “any . . . area
where minors congregate.” GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(d), (g) (West 2013); see also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE U.S. 81–86, 92–97, 117
(2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907webwcover.pdf
(discussing the impact of restrictions on offenders); Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 32, R
at 1109–13 (describing restrictions on offenders’ freedom of movement, residency, and
employment).
123 Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 729 (N.C. 2008).
124 See Complaint at 2–3, John Doe v. City of Costa Mesa, No. 8:12-CV-01665-AG-RNB
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2013).
125 See Jaimee Lynn Fletcher, H.B. Changes Sex Offender Ordinance After Lawsuit, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/ordinance-408906-sex-
beach.html.  Moreover, exemptions previously offered by Orange County appear to be stin-
gily guarded, with fourteen out of fifteen requests turned down as of May 2012.  Those
whose applications were rejected reportedly included a commercial fisherman who re-
quired access to the harbor to work, a locksmith who worked by the harbor and claimed to
have had a clear record for twenty-eight years, and someone who wanted to attend a me-
morial service for his Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor. See Ian Lovett, Public-Place Laws
Tighten Rein on Sex Offenders but Raise Questions, Too, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A15.
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The scope of the restrictions also has become increasingly oner-
ous over time.126  What started out as buffer zones of 1000 feet or less
have expanded to 2000 feet or more in several states.127  Prohibited
areas have grown from “school” and “child care zones” to include set
distances from swimming pools, skating rinks, parks, bus stops, and
video arcades.128  In many municipalities, these buffer zones are cou-
pled with “dispersion” statutes that seek to control the spatial density
of offenders by, for example, limiting the number of offenders that
can live within a particular residential structure.129  In other areas,
designated offenders are relegated to a small sliver of a city where they
are permitted to live.130  Offenders have been kicked out of their
homes and sometimes rendered homeless as a result; in some cases,
entire towns and municipalities effectively have been placed off-limits
to registered offenders.131
126 Kansas provides a notable exception.  After considering a report of the Kansas Sex
Offender Policy Board, the Kansas state legislature chose not to impose residential restric-
tions on offenders and explicitly prohibited municipalities from doing so as well. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-4913 (West 2011).
127 See ALA. CODE § 15-20A-11(a) (2011) (2000-foot zone around school or child-care
facility); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5(b) (West 2013) (2000-foot zone around any public or
private school, or park “where children regularly gather”); IOWA CODE § 692A.114 (2009)
(2000-foot zone around school or child care facility).
128 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-16 (West 2013) (prohibiting registered sex offenders
from residing or working within 1000 feet of “areas where minors congregate,” including
skating rinks and swimming pools); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(2) (2009) (prohibiting
“sexually violent” predators from being 1000 feet from public swimming pools and video
arcades, among other places); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.150 (2012) (prohibiting certain of-
fenders from being within 500 feet of a park or swimming pool); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-535
(2011) (prohibiting convicted sex offenders from residing within 1000 feet of a school,
daycare center, children’s recreational facility, park, or playground).
129 See Tony H. Grubesic, Alan T. Murray & Elizabeth A. Mack, Sex Offenders, Residence
Restrictions, Housing, and Urban Morphology: A Review and Synthesis, 13 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y
DEV. & RES. 3, 7, 11–12 (2011) (discussing efforts to manage the spatial distribution of
registered sex offenders).
130 See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he restricted areas in many
cities encompass the majority of the available housing in the city, thus leaving only limited
areas within city limits available for sex offenders to establish a residence.”); In re E.J., 223
P.3d 31, 37 (Cal. 2010) (describing how after initially being told that San Francisco was
completely off limits, petitioner was informed of a “small area” where he could live, but
housing prices were prohibitively high); In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 83 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012) (finding that residential restriction “eliminates nearly all existing affordable housing
[as applied] in San Diego County”), review granted and opinion suspended, In re Taylor, 290
P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2013); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 445 (Ky. 2009) (describ-
ing the “constant threat of eviction”); Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2011) (detailing residential restrictions that “effectively . . . banished” parolees from
Manhattan).
131 See, e.g., In re E.J., 223 P.3d at 46 (describing petitioners’ claim that housing restric-
tions rendered them homeless but also noting that many others found compliant hous-
ing); In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 70, 73 (describing petitioner, who was prohibited
from living with her sister-in-law or in any women’s shelters, as living in alley with 15 to 20
other homeless registered sex offenders and finding that as of February 2011, 165 out of
482 registered sex offenders on parole in San Diego were homeless or with “no resi-
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Lists of prohibited employment similarly have expanded to in-
clude bans not only on working directly with children but also on
working in certain geographic areas where children might congre-
gate.132  In another relatively recent development, several states now
require certain offenders to wear GPS devices, which impose restric-
tions on movement and establish de facto curfews given the need to
be home at certain hours in order to recharge the devices.133  Some-
times the decision to require the use of a GPS is made on an individu-
alized basis, but often it is imposed without any particularized
assessment of the threat posed.134
The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether, and under
what circumstances, such residential, employment, and other restric-
tions on offenders’ movements are constitutionally permitted.  While
the Court’s twin rulings in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v.
Doe135 and Smith v. Doe136 have been widely credited with paving the
way for such restrictions, both cases involved registration and dissemi-
nation schemes only.  In Smith, the Court explicitly emphasized that
“offenders . . . are free to move where they wish and to live and work
as other citizens, with no supervision” as relevant to its finding that
Alaska’s registration and verification scheme was nonpunitive and
therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.137  And in Connecti-
cut Department of Public Safety, the Court addressed procedural due pro-
cess issues only—explicitly leaving open the possibility of future
substantive due process claims.138
dence”); see also Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended Collateral Consequences of
Sex Offender Residency Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 534–35 (2007) (describing
the difficulty sex offenders have in finding housing).
132 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-16(c)(1) (West 2013) (prohibiting certain offenders
from working within 1000 feet of area where minors congregate); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265,
§ 48 (2012) (prohibiting ice cream vending explicitly).
133 See, e.g., State v. Bowditch, 700 S.E.2d 1, 4–6 (N.C. 2010) (describing the ways in
which the GPS device limited movement yet upholding lifetime GPS monitoring for per-
sons convicted of certain offenses).
134 Id.; see also Murphy, supra note 21, at 1333 (describing use of GPS devices to track R
sex offenders and others).
135 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (rejecting procedural due process challenge to Connecticut’s
sex offender registry).
136 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003) (rejecting ex post facto challenge to Alaska’s sex offender
registry).
137 Id. at 101; see id. at 100 (emphasizing that the Act “does not restrain activities sex
offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or residences”); id. at 101 (em-
phasizing that, unlike probation or parole requirements, Alaska did not require in-person
verifications for sex offenders).
138 See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 8 (“Because the question is not properly
before us, we express no opinion as to whether Connecticut’s Megan’s Law violates princi-
ples of substantive due process.”); see also id. at 9–10 (Souter, J. and Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring) (emphasizing that the ruling did not foreclose substantive due process or equal
protection claims).
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A small handful of state courts have since concluded that increas-
ingly restrictive aspects of the registration scheme as well as associated
residential and employment restrictions are in fact punitive and vio-
late the Ex Post Facto Clause on both state and federal law grounds.139
But federal appellate courts and other state courts have disagreed.140
Meanwhile, successful ex post facto claims only preclude the retroac-
tive application of such restrictions; they do not restrict their prospec-
tive use.
Meanwhile, appellate courts have—in the limited circumstances
where the issue has been raised—rejected broader claims that the re-
strictions violate the Equal Protection Clause, substantive due process
rights, or the Eighth Amendment.141  That said, a California appellate
court recently issued a notable ruling striking down blanket residen-
tial requirements as violating the right to travel.142  Emphasizing that
139 See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E. 2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (finding ex post facto viola-
tion under state constitution); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Ky. 2009)
(finding ex post facto violation under both state and federal constitutions); State v.
Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 2009) (finding an ex post facto violation under both the state
and federal constitutions); F.R. v. St. Charles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 301 S.W.3d 56, 66 (Mo.
2010) (finding laws punitive and in violation of ex post facto clause of state constitution);
State v. Williams, 952 N.E. 2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (holding that retroactive application
of registration requirements on persons who committed sex offenses prior to enactment of
the statute violated the state constitution).
140 See, e.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010, 1019–20 (8th Cir. 2006)
(upholding Arkansas law); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 723 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding
Iowa law); In re E.J., 223 P.3d 31, 47 (Cal. 2010) (rejecting ex post facto challenges); State
v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 670 (Iowa 2005) (same); Boyd v. State, 960 So. 2d 717, 719–20
(Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (rejecting claim that application of statute was excessively punitive
such as to constitute an ex post facto violation).
141 See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity of Statutes Imposing Residency
Restrictions on Registered Sex Offenders, 25 A.L.R. 6th 227, 232–35 (2007) (collecting cases).  A
small number of cases have held restrictions imposed on sex offenders to be unlawful in
their prospective use.  See, e.g., Doe v. Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2012)
(concluding that a ban on offenders entering the library violated their First Amendment
rights but paving the way for the imposition of such a ban in the future, noting that “it is
not difficult to imagine that the ban might have survived [on a different record], for we
recognize the City’s significant interest in providing a safe environment for its library pa-
trons, especially children”); Santos v. State, 668 S.E.2d 676, 679 (Ga. 2008) (concluding
that registration requirements were unconstitutionally vague as applied to the homeless);
Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 740–41 (Ga. 2007) (holding that a provision
requiring the plaintiff to vacate his home after a child care center moved within the exclu-
sion zone constituted an unlawful taking); Elwell v. Twp. of Lower, 2006 WL 3797974, at
*15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 22, 2006) (finding that the prohibitions, which pre-
vented plaintiff from taking his children to the school bus or to school, “substantially in-
trude[d] upon significant family matters involving private and personal choices about how
to raise and care for children” and therefore violated petitioner’s substantive due process
rights).
142 In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 83 (Cal. App. 2012), review granted and opinion
suspended, In re Taylor, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566 (Cal. 2013).  While In re Taylor addressed the
application of residential restrictions to parolees in San Diego, the underlying statute ap-
plies to all registered sex offenders throughout California, not just those on parole and in
San Diego. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5(b) (West 2006) (prohibiting all registered sex
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the residential restrictions contributed to homelessness, prevented pa-
rolees from getting the treatment services they needed, and separated
families, the court concluded that the restrictions intruded on impor-
tant liberty interests and were not narrowly tailored to the asserted
government interest in protecting children from recidivist offend-
ers.143  The ruling, which is as of this writing suspended pending re-
view by the California Supreme Court, would allow parole officers to
impose such restrictions on an individualized basis, but prohibits their
blanket application to all registered sex offenders without a particular-
ized evaluation of threat and need.144  This is an approach that I
strongly endorse, as explained in more detail in Part III.
D. Other Examples—A Pre-Crime Typology
The financial sanction regime, No Fly List, and sex offender re-
strictions illustrate a broader trend in which legislators and Executive
Branch officials increasingly target particular individuals or classes of
individuals with preventive and noncustodial restraints, all based on a
presumed propensity to commit a future bad act.  Other analogous
examples include firearm restrictions imposed on convicted felons
and other classes of presumptively dangerous individuals;145 no-con-
tact orders issued in response to allegations of domestic violence;146
supervised-release conditions imposed on presumptively dangerous
aliens;147 pilot-license revocations based on a “suspected” security
threat;148 and security-clearance revocations based on “a recent or re-
offenders from “resid[ing] within 2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where
children regularly gather”).
143 In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 83.
144 Id. at 83–84.
145 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).  Often referred to as “felon-gun” restrictions, the restric-
tions actually cover a broader class of individuals.  In District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice
Scalia went out of his way to note that the Court’s striking down of a prohibition on hand-
gun possession did not “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-
arms by felons.”  554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
146 See, e.g., Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 14–22 (2006)
(describing and critiquing evolution of stay away orders in domestic violence cases).
147 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700 (2001) (analyzing supervised release
conditions).
148 49 C.F.R. § 1540.117(c) (2013) (describing threat assessment standards for aliens
holding or applying for FAA certificates, ratings, or authorizations); 49 C.F.R. § 1540.115
(2013) (describing threat assessment standards for U.S. citizens).  An initial threat finding
leads to an immediate loss of license.  Citizens are, by statute, entitled to a hearing before
an administrative law judge of any final orders, at which they are entitled to unclassified
summaries of any classified information relied upon.  49 U.S.C. § 46111 (2006).  Aliens, by
contrast, are not entitled to an administrative law judge hearing and need not be provided
summaries of the classified information.  Court review is concentrated in the Court of Ap-
peals, with deference given to any agency finding supported by “substantial evidence.”  49
U.S.C. § 46110(c) (2006).
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curring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emo-
tionally unstable behavior.”149
The details vary significantly from program to program, and the
specifics are important.  Broadly speaking, there are two contrasting
models of pre-crime restraints.  One, which I call the tailored, adjudi-
catory model, requires individualized assessments of risk and is pre-
mised on a view of human nature as malleable and subject to
rehabilitation and reform.  It is based on a particularized assessment
of risk and recognizes—at least in theory—that changed circum-
stances, including rehabilitation of the target, can eliminate or suffi-
ciently reduce the risk the restraint is designed to address.  Restraints
are thus designed to last no longer than the risk posed; they are
time-limited and subject to regular, periodic reviews.  In the most pro-
tective form, the restraints are court-imposed or at least subject to de
novo court review as a means of minimizing bias, error, or outright
abuse.  It is the approach I argue we should be moving toward—as I
discuss in more detail in Part III—although the difficulty of predicting
risk and costs to the target’s moral autonomy should give us pause
even in the exercise of these types of restraints.
The other, which I call the rule-based model, is imposed on all
persons with certain features, without individualized assessment of
risk.  Under the rule-based model, the fact that some percentage of
individuals with certain characteristics is likely to commit a future bad
act becomes a justification for imposing restraints on all people who
possess those characteristics.  As the gravity of the future bad act in-
creases, the acceptable ratio of innocent to bad actors increases, re-
sulting in a greater proportion of persons who never would have
committed any future harm being subject to extensive preventive re-
straints.  Because rule-based restraints are imposed on all individuals
who satisfy a particular, cognizable set of facts, judicial review is either
nonexistent or limited solely to the question as to whether or not the
predicate facts are met, without any individualized assessment of risk.
Sex offender restrictions, felon-gun restrictions, and certain no-con-
tact orders (imposed on all accused of certain types of offenses) are
classic examples of rule-based restraints.150
149 See 32 C.F.R. § 147.2(d) (2013) (describing criteria for granting and revoking se-
curity clearances).
150 Several scholars have also noted the ways in which adjudicated, particularized re-
straints actually operate as rule-based restraints in disguise. See, e.g., infra notes 184, 186. R
Actuarial prediction models, for example, take a number of identified factors, feed them
into an algorithm, and predict risk, essentially assuming that the dominant group charac-
teristics translate onto a particular individual in a predictable way.  If given conclusive
weight, these seemingly individualized restraints can also operate as rule-based restraints,
imposing certain preventive restraints on all persons possessing particular characteristics
without any individualized assessments or adjustments.
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Most pre-crime restraints encompass some features of both the
rule-based model and the tailored, adjudicatory model.  Terrorism-re-
lated financial sanctions and the No Fly List, for example, are based
on individualized assessments of a particular individual or entity’s pro-
pensity to commit a bad act, thus adopting a key feature of the adjudi-
catory model.  But, at least with respect to the terrorism-related
financial regime, the criteria for being subject to the restraint are so
broad as to defy any notion of narrow tailoring.  (The criteria for
placement on the No Fly List also appear broad, given the numbers
reportedly on the list, although they remain unknown.)  Moreover,
there is no independent adjudicator to help correct any errors or
abuse.  The absence of any time limits or meaningful periodic review
provisions further suggests a rule-based vision of targets as incapable
or unlikely to change—or, at the very least, an unwillingness to give
the targets an opportunity to act differently than predicted due to a
high level of risk-aversion.
II
THE LIBERTY INTERESTS AND RISKS OF EXPLOSION
Over the past decade, there has been extensive attention to vari-
ous forms of preventive detention—including law-of-war detention,151
the preventive tilt of the criminal justice system,152 immigration deten-
tion,153 and civil commitment regimes.154  Meanwhile, it is often as-
sumed, without much analysis, that noncustodial restraints are a
151 See, e.g., Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1108–46 (describing evolution and R
institutionalization of law of war detention after September 11, 2001); Cole, supra note 31, R
at 725–32 (discussing legal questions surrounding military detention of enemy combat-
ants); Jonathan Hafetz, Military Detention in the “War on Terrorism”: Normalizing the Exceptional
After 9/11, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 36–42 (2012) (discussing the law of war deten-
tion after 9/11).
152 See, e.g., Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1092–93 (discussing the difference R
between the “preventive” state and the “punitive” state).  The normative consequences of
this move are the topic of an ongoing and debate. Compare Paul H. Robinson, Punishing
Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432
(2001) (arguing in favor of separating preventative and punishment functions), and
Steiker, supra note 5, at 814 (arguing for a distinct role for punishment based on, among R
other things, its retrospective nature and blaming function), with Christopher Slobogin,
The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 122 (2005) (arguing that “individ-
ual prevention should become the predominant goal of the criminal justice system”); see
also Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Prevention and Criminalization: Justifications and Lim-
its, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 542, 563–71 (2012) (exploring these issues).
153 See, e.g., David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51
EMORY L.J. 1003, 1004–08 (2002) (discussing the evolution of immigration detention re-
gimes pre- and post-9/11).
154 See, e.g., Janus & Logan, supra note 31, at 321–25 (discussing due process concerns R
with respect to civil commitment of sexually violent predators); Schulhofer, supra note 29, R
at 94–96 (arguing for commitment of sexually violent predators only in limited cases); see
also Klein & Wittes, supra note 31, at 87 (cataloguing various forms of preventive R
detention).
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permissible alternative to custodial restraints that are prohibited.  In
its 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, for example, the Supreme Court
ruled that aliens could not be detained pending deportation if the
deportation was no longer reasonably foreseeable; at the same time, it
explicitly mentioned, albeit in dicta, the availability of alternative
forms of noncustodial restraint.155  In the Court’s words, the “alien’s
release may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of
supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances.”156  The
unambiguous message: noncustodial restraints are permitted under
circumstances where custodial ones are prohibited.157
But the favoring of noncustodial restraints as an alternative to
custodial ones masks the important substantive and procedural liberty
interests at stake and ignores the dangers associated with all pre-crime
restraints, whether they be custodial or not.  To some extent, this over-
sight is understandable: After all, who would not choose release with
restrictions over incarceration, as the Zadvydas Court suggested?  But
the choice is rarely such an easy one-for-one.  In part because noncus-
todial restraints are perceived as less invasive, they are imposed on a
much broader swath of the population that would be—or could be—
subject to physical incarceration, persist for protracted periods of
time, and are imposed with much less process than carceral restraints.
What if, for example, the question is five months in prison or five years
subject to extensive restrictions on where one can go and what one
can do?  Then the choice is no longer so obvious.158
In this Part, I explore both the often underappreciated liberty
interests affected by noncustodial restraints and the general costs of
all pre-crime restraints, thus offering a lens through which to better
evaluate the interests at stake when the state engages in targeted pre-
crime prevention.
A. The Invasion of Liberty
Physical incarceration has, for good reason, long been under-
stood as the quintessential deprivation of liberty.  It removes detainees
from the polity, subjects them to control by others, and denies them
the ability to live their own lives in the manner they choose.  It is for
this reason that the Supreme Court has repeatedly defined physical
incarceration as the “paradigmatic affirmative disability or re-
straint,”159  freedom from which is at the “core of the liberty protected
155 See 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
156 Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
157 The Zadvydas court did emphasize that such noncustodial restraints need to be
“appropriate” but did not define the term. Id.
158 Professor Murphy makes this point as well in Paradigms of Restraint, supra note 21, at R
1323.
159 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003).
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by the Due Process Clause.”160  The deprivation is so visceral and obvi-
ous that there is rarely any explanation as to why this is so.
In a few limited cases, the Supreme Court has similarly recog-
nized the devastating effect of targeted, noncustodial restraints—but
this recognition is generally limited to the extreme situations in which
the individual is formally stripped of legal status or physically removed
from the polity.161  As the Court concluded in its 1958 decision in Trop
v. Dulles, forced statelessness violates the Eighth Amendment: “There
may be involved no physical mistreatment . . . .  There is instead the
total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society.”162
Deportation has similarly been described as depriving individuals “of
all that makes life worth living.”163  Affected individuals maintain their
nationality and remain physically free but are stripped from their fam-
ily, friends, employment, and the polity of their choosing.  These indi-
viduals are divested of the context that gives them and their lives
meaning and told to start again in a place that they have not been to
in years and feels foreign to them, even if it is their legal home.
What the Court has failed to recognize is the ways in which non-
custodial restraints can, and often do, deprive a target of the capacity
160 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).  One explanation as to why this liberty
interest is “core” is the often-cited historical and textual one—that “liberty” should be in-
terpreted as it was in 1789 or possibly 1868, when it was understood as referring exclusively
to “liberty of the person” or freedom from physical restraint. See Charles Warren, The New
“Liberty” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 440 (1926).  But even ac-
cepting the accuracy of the historical analysis, this approach fails to explain why freedom
from physical restraint was deemed a core liberty interest and what underlying interests are
at stake. See Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That
Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897 (2004) (forcefully rejecting the idea
that “courts more or less passively identify a set of personal activities in which individuals
may engage free of government regulation . . . derive[d] from American constitutional text
and tradition”); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952) (“To believe that this
judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some
fixed stage of time or thought is to suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional
adjudication is a function for inanimate machines and not for judges . . . .”).
161 By comparison, violations of bodily integrity are more readily recognized as intru-
sions on established rights given the overt way in which they inflict pain or intrude in one’s
physical space in a way that is easy to identify and measure. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753, 755 (1985) (holding that forced surgical removal of a bullet for evidentiary pur-
poses violates an individual’s interest in bodily integrity and therefore his Fourth Amend-
ment rights); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173 (concluding that forced stomach-pumping of a
suspected drug user is “brutal conduct” that violates due process).
162 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  The Court went on to call it “a form of punishment more
primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was
centuries in the development. . . .  In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.”
Id. at 101–02; see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding that forced state-
lessness violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
163 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 284 (1922)); see also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“To deport
one who so claims to be a citizen, obviously deprives him of liberty.”).  Deportation is less
extreme than forced statelessness, as the affected individual retains some legal status.
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to lead a meaningful and free life, treat him as second-class citizen,
and deny his moral autonomy, even if they do not place him behind
bars, formally strip him of legal status, or physically remove him from
the polity.  This section will address each of these deprivations in turn.
1. De Facto Incapacitation
In the words of Professor Martha Nussbaum, people can be so
restricted from “select[ing] modes of activity that are central to a life
worthy of human dignity” that they are more “like prisoners” than
“free people.”164  The imprisonment can be near total, prohibiting a
broad range of functioning, or partial, affecting discrete but central
components of a meaningful life.  Critically, physical incapacitation is
not required.
This, of course, requires a theory of what makes a life worth liv-
ing, and here Supreme Court jurisprudence provides the key gui-
dance.  At various points, with varying degrees of emphasis, and with
various textual hooks, the Court has identified the capabilities to
move freely,165 travel,166 maintain familial association free from state
interference,167 enter into intimate relationships,168 pursue one’s cho-
164 Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 6.  Professor Nussbaum also makes a compelling argu- R
ment as to how the Declaration of Independence reflects the central idea of equal dignity
and equal entitlement. See id. at 50–51.
165 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 (1999) (“[A]n individual’s deci-
sion to remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom
of movement inside frontiers that is ‘a part of our heritage.’”) (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).
166 See, e.g., Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1486–87 (2012) (describing restriction
on international travel as a “new disability” and a “harsh penalty, made all the more devas-
tating if it means enduring separation from close family members living abroad”); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630–31 (1969) (describing a fundamental right to interstate
travel but declining to ascribe the source of the right to a particular constitutional provi-
sion); id. at 671 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he right to travel interstate is a ‘fundamental’
right which, for present purposes, should be regarded as having its source in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (“The
right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment.”).
167 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (describing the
“freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life [as] one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
168 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (upholding right to consen-
sual homosexual “intimate conduct”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–86
(1965) (upholding the right to access contraception).
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sen vocation,169 and raise one’s children without state interference170
as central liberties that the Constitution protects.171  As Professor Lau-
rence Tribe has cogently argued, what unites these various cases is
larger than and conceptually different from their parts.  What matters
is the individual’s ability to participate in the polity and to self-gov-
ern—to be given the freedom to make the choices that are central to
defining and expressing oneself and to making life meaningful.172
In some cases, pre-crime restraints can so thoroughly deprive an
individual of the capacity to participate in the polity and define him-
or herself free from state interference that they impose a form of
near-total imprisonment.  U.S. residents subject to the financial sanc-
tion regimes, for example, may be physically free, yet they are effec-
tively barred from engaging in the society in which they live.  They
cannot partake in a single financial transaction without government
approval.  Even the ability to buy groceries, make rent payments, pay
for gas, or buy a school uniform is dependent on a government li-
cense and thus becomes a matter of state control.
169 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) (describing “the right to . . .
follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference [as] within
the ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ concepts of the Fifth Amendment” (citations omitted)); cf. Caf-
eteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 437 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894–99 (1961) (holding
that summarily imposed restrictions which prevented plaintiff from accessing her place of
employment did not violate plaintiff’s due process rights given the availability of other
possible places of employment).
170 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (describing the
“liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control”).
171 See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 & n.26 (1977) (describing the
liberty “interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that liberty “denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness by free men”).  This list also has obvious parallels with the list of
protected rights under human rights law. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights arts. 2, 22, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20; Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 6, Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19 (describing right to work, including the “the right of
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts”);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2012) (defining “major life activities” as that term is used
in the Anti-Discrimination Act to include “communicating, and working”); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(i)(1) (2013) (adding “interacting with others” as among the “major life activities”
protected by the Anti-Discrimination Act).
172 Tribe, supra note 160, at 1941–42; see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 R
HARV. L. REV. 737, 805 (1989) (describing the ways in which “state control over the quotid-
ian, material aspects of individuals’ lives—even where the people have democratically im-
posed such control themselves—deprives them of th[e] freedom [to self-govern]”).  While
Rubenfeld is examining the right to privacy, his analysis can be extended to claims like
those made in this Article that largely sound in substantive due process.
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The combination of residential, employment, and other restric-
tions on movement imposed on presumptively dangerous sex offend-
ers has a similarly pervasive impact—relegating them to small slivers
of land where they can live, barring their movement, restricting their
employment, limiting their choice of homes, and indirectly yet se-
verely limiting their ability to participate in important ways in their
children’s lives.
In other instances, noncustodial restrictions impose a form of
partial imprisonment, impeding discrete components of a free and
meaningful life.  The effect of the No Fly List, for example, is not as
restrictive as the most severe sex offender–related restrictions but has
a significant and underappreciated impact on substantive liberty inter-
ests nonetheless.  In prohibiting an important mode of transporta-
tion, it restricts and potentially eliminates the ability to “attend
funerals and weddings of family members, tend to vital interests, or
respond to family emergencies” in a timely manner.173  It also signifi-
cantly curtails the ability to pursue a profession of one’s choosing.
Even if travel is not a regular part of one’s job responsibilities, occa-
sional trips to conferences, trainings, or other professional gatherings
may be required, and transport by car, bus, or boat may not be reason-
ably viable alternatives.
When evaluated in social and historical context, with an under-
standing of the central role plane travel has assumed in modern life, it
becomes obvious that the prohibition on flying significantly intrudes
on liberty interests that the Supreme Court has recognized as impor-
tant, even if not fundamental, including the ability to maintain famil-
ial connections, other associations, and employment of one’s
choosing.174  The prohibition’s effect is significantly greater than the
government’s description of a “right to the most convenient means of
travel” suggests.175
2. Second-Class Treatment
Most targeted pre-crime restraints also interfere with the impor-
tant liberty interest in being treated with equal dignity.176  While not
173 Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1487 (2012); see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 126 (1958) (noting that the freedom to travel internationally “may be as close to the
heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads”).
174 See supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text. R
175 Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Latif v. Holder, supra note 17, at 24; see Latif v. Holder, No. R
3:10-CV-00750-BR, 2013 WL 4592515, at *8 (D. Or. Aug. 28, 2013) (rejecting the govern-
ment’s argument as applied to international travel by stating: “Although there are perhaps
viable alternatives to flying for domestic travel within the continental United States such as
traveling by car or train, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ contention that interna-
tional air travel is a mere convenience in light of the realities of our modern world”).
176 The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in United States v. Windsor provides additional
support for the liberty interest in being treated with “equal dignity.”  133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681
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the principal purpose of most targeted restraints, the effect is to single
out particular individuals or classes of individuals, precluding them
from engaging in activities that others can do freely and thereby
stamping them with a badge of inferiority.177  As Professor Michael C.
Dorf has persuasively argued, “the designation as a sex offender truly
comes close to a designation of second-class citizenship,” thereby rais-
ing equal protection concerns.178  The same can be said of “specially
designated global terrorists” and other subjects of targeted
prevention.179
This is not to suggest that all targeted restraints operate in this
way.  When the state imposes criminal penalties, it sanctions conduct,
not personhood (at least in theory).180  But the shift in focus from
past acts to the future carries with it a shift in emphasis from conduct
to character.  In imposing restraints in response to perceived future
threats, the state conveys its assessment that the targets are insuffi-
ciently trustworthy—and therefore less deserving—than the vast ma-
jority of the populace not subject to such restraints on their activities
(2013).  In Windsor, the Court declared the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to be a
violation of “basic due process and equal protection principles” given its purpose and ef-
fect of “impos[ing] inequality” and “demean[ing]” particular classes of individuals. Id. at
2681, 2695 (“While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government the power to
degrade or demean in the way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Four-
teenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and all the
better understood and preserved.”); Larry Tribe, DOMA, Prop 8, and Justice Scalia’s Intemper-
ate Dissent, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/
doma-prop-8-and-justice-scalias-intemperate-dissent/ (describing Windsor as relying on “a
combination of equal protection principles and precepts of federalism—a combination
textually at home in adjudication under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment”).
177 This is an obvious distinction between the pre-crime examples discussed here and
the DOMA struck down in Windsor.  In Windsor, the Court emphasized that both the “prin-
cipal purpose” and the effect of DOMA were to “impose inequality.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at
2694.  Most pre-crime restraints have a primary purpose of preventing crime or other bad
acts, with a key effect being a denial of equal treatment and dignity.
178 Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Mean-
ings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1340 (2011).  While Professor Dorf was specifically focused on the
registration requirements, his statement is even more apt when one considers the array of
residential, employment, and other restrictions that accompany the designation.  As Pro-
fessor Dorf goes on to argue, this does not mean that such designations ought to be cate-
gorically prohibited, but there needs to be much better means-ends tailoring. See id. at
1340–42.  This is an issue I return to in Part III.
179 This concern about second-class treatment applies to those pre-crime restraints
that prohibit individuals from doing what all other members of society do freely, such as
engaging in basic financial transactions or going to a public park; it does not apply to the
denial or rescinding of a specially granted license, such as a security clearance or pilot
license revocation.
180 Id. at 1311 (“Imprisoning persons for murder, rape, and robbery, and branding
them felons, no doubt expresses a view about the inferiority of the conduct in which mur-
derers, rapists, and robbers engage, without thereby expressing a view about the inherent
moral worth of the perpetrators.”).
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or movements.  The state signals an implicit, or at times explicit, find-
ing of moral depravity or lack of control.
Moreover, this is not simply a case of expressive harm or stigma
standing alone.  The badge of dangerousness is coupled with affirma-
tive restrictions that prevent the targets from engaging in activities
that other members of society can freely do, thereby raising both
equal protection and due process concerns.
3. Respect for Moral Autonomy
The imposition of pre-crime restraints also undercuts a central
aspect of individual liberty by failing to respect the moral autonomy of
the targeted individual.  This point is often made by retributionists
and quasi-retributionists and is one to which consequentialists lack a
persuasive response.181  Even if one could imagine an idealized world
with an extremely low rate of predictive error, the preventive nature
of the restraint precludes the individual from taking steps to defeat
the prediction and make the “right” moral choice.  As the philosopher
Saul Smilansky has argued, “there is categorically still time, a ‘window
of moral opportunity’ for the would-be offender.  This moral opportu-
nity needs to be acknowledged.”182
Unless the individual lacks the capacity to make autonomous
choices, as in the case of the truly mentally ill, preventive restraints
violate their targets’ moral autonomy.  These restraints assume a fixed
future and destroy the opportunity for individual self-determination—
precluding the possibility that individuals can demonstrate their
moral goodness and choose a course of action that differs from the
prediction.183  Such restraints can only be justified by a purely deter-
ministic view of individual action or a decision that respect for moral
autonomy needs to give way to a different set of interests, such as pro-
tection of the nation’s or community’s safety.  Such a decision must be
made with an accurate weighing of the individual interest, risk of
181 See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 152, at 144–45 (noting inaccuracies of predictive tools R
but evading questions about the ways in which a preventive model of criminal justice de-
nies individual autonomy to act differently than predicted).
182 Saul Smilansky, The Time to Punish, 54 ANALYSIS 50, 52 (1994).  Although Smilansky
was discussing preventive punishment, the observation applies to all preventive, targeted
restrictions of liberty, even if they are ostensibly deemed nonpunitive.
183 Actuarial modeling, for example, as employed in the sex offender commitment
context is implicitly based on a deterministic view of human behavior.  Psychologists and
psychiatrists evaluate a number of factors to determine an offenders’ likelihood of reof-
fending: if person A has X characteristics, he will do Y with a certain degree of certainty.
See, e.g., Jill S. Levenson & John W. Morin, Factors Predicting Selection of Sexually Violent
Predators for Civil Commitment, 50 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 609,
625–26 (2006) (“The actuarial risk assessment instruments used to predict sexual recidi-
vism are based primarily on static factors.”).  These models fail to account for the moral
autonomy of individuals and the fact that they may act differently than predicted.
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harm, and normative principle at stake.  When dealing with unpopu-
lar groups, such as sex offenders or alleged terrorist financers, how-
ever, there is a significant risk that the risk of harm will be overvalued
and the individual interest undervalued.
* * *
In sum, noncustodial pre-crime restraints impinge on the target’s
liberty interests in a number of important ways—imposing a form of
de facto imprisonment (either partial or total), stamping the target as
having less than equal worth, and denying the target respect for his
moral autonomy.  It is not the case—as current doctrine often as-
sumes—that there is an on–off switch by which preventive detention
impinges on an array of important substantive liberty interests,
whereas restraints that fall short of incarceration are so minimally in-
trusive that they are of minor constitutional significance at best.  Vari-
ous preventive noncustodial restraints might nonetheless be
permissible, but there ought to be a much more thorough means-ends
inquiry than currently takes place.  This is a point which I return to in
Part III.
B. The Risk of Error and the One-Way Ratchet
Even if the liberty intrusions of noncustodial restraints were prop-
erly calibrated, the targeted, preventive nature of the restraints pre-
sent an independent set of concerns—concerns borne out by an
examination of the financial sanction regime, No Fly List, and sex of-
fender restrictions.  This is so for three primary reasons: the risk of
error and abuse, the inherent difficulty of disproving a propensity to
do something bad,184 and the incentives to overreach.
1. Predictive Errors
Pre-crime restraints are premised on predictions about the fu-
ture—predictions that are rife with uncertainty and error.  Even when
the most sophisticated actuarial or clinical assessment tools are em-
ployed, the ability to predict that a particular individual will commit
some future bad act inherently involves guesswork and false posi-
184 Whether or not this concern also applies to the restrictions imposed on entities,
such as targeted financial sanctions, depends on whether one views an entity as a moral
actor, a topic which is the subject of extensive philosophical debate and which I do not
wade into here. See Collective Responsibility, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2d
ed. 2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-responsibility/#1
(describing the debate).  The concerns about error and overreach, however, clearly apply
to restraints imposed on entities and may seem independently sufficient to justify height-
ened scrutiny of these restraints as well.
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tives.185  Even the best risk-assessment tools assume some percentage
of false positives—meaning that they are designed with the knowledge
that they will capture some individuals who would never engage in the
activity designed to prevent.186  The broad, subjective criteria that the
Executive Branch employs in the application of national secur-
ity–related restraints exacerbate the risk of error.  Under the terror-
ism financial sanction regime, for example, individuals and entities
can be defined as a “specially designated global terrorist” based solely
on an Executive Branch determination that the entity or individual
“pose[s] a significant risk of committing[ ] acts of terrorism.”187
There are no actuarial models or empirically tested criteria for identi-
fying who might in fact pose a security threat.188  Determinations are
purely a matter of executive discretion.
Moreover, even if targeting decisions are based on empirically
sound criteria and made in good faith, the incentives push in favor of
expansive application.  Pre-crime restraints are put in place to protect
public safety and implemented with that primary motivating principle
in mind.  If there is doubt in a particular case, the incentives are on
the side of imposing the restraint.  The Deputy Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration admitted as much in explain-
ing a pilot revocation decision: “[B]ecause it would be very difficult to
avert harm once a terrorist had control of an aircraft, I concluded that
it was important to err on the side of caution in determining whether
[the pilots] . . . pose a security threat . . . .”189  This same fear of an
unaverted harm haunts all security-minded officials.  Simply put, the
preventive mindset turns the criminal law adage that “it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free” on its
head.190
185 There is a rich body of literature on the difficulties of accurately predicting future
dangerousness. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Protecting Liberty and Autonomy: Desert/Disease Ju-
risprudence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1077, 1081–82, 1125 (2011) (summarizing the literature
and suggesting that risk assessments are improving in accuracy but emphasizing the limited
ability to predict accurately, the problems of applying group data to make individualized
predictions, and the incentives in favor of false positives).  For a powerful argument against
the reliance of actuarial models to predict future risk, see generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT,
AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007)
(providing a number of reasons to challenge the “actuarial paradigm”).
186 See, e.g., Ruth J. Tully et al., A Stystematic Review on the Effectiveness of Sex Offender Risk
Assessment Tools in Predicting Sexual Recidivism of Adult Male Sex Offenders, 33 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. REV. 287, 288 (2013) (describing “false positives” associated with risk assessments,
including actuarial tools, and evaluating predictive accuracy of a range of actuarial and
nonactuarial approaches to sex offender risk assessment).
187 Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,079–80 (Sept. 25, 2001).
188 This is not to say that an actuarial or empirically tested method would solve the
problem of both false positives and false negatives. See supra notes 181–84. R
189 Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting
the Deputy Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration).
190 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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A lack of any meaningful independent review further increases
the likelihood of error or abuse.  The mere fact, or likelihood, of in-
dependent review serves as a moderating influence, providing a
strong incentive for the decision makers to act in a way they can justify
to a court or analogous review board.  Independent oversight also
serves an important educative function, helping to ensure that offi-
cials learn about and take steps to correct errors.  In its absence, inef-
fective or unnecessary restraints are much more likely to persist.
Blatant discrimination or other abuses are also left unchecked.191  Of
course, the effectiveness and stringency of this review depends on the
breadth of the substantive rules: if the substantive rules are excessively
broad, review will do little to rein in executive overreaching and false
positives, even if it might still uncover outright abuse.
Undifferentiated, rule-based restraints, such as those employed
on sex offenders, dispense with individualized predictions altogether,
thereby imposing restraints on a large number of individuals who
never would have committed the bad act the restraints are designed to
prevent.  Research on sex offenders indicates, for example, that recid-
ivism is fairly low as compared to other convicted offenders and that
the majority of sexual assaults is committed against an intimate and
known victim.192  Assuming this data is even remotely accurate, most
of those subjected to residential and employment restrictions pose no
risk of reoffending at all, and even fewer pose a risk of stranger as-
sault, which is what the residential and employment controls are de-
signed to prevent.193
191 See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 227, 243 (2006) (describing how lack of oversight exacerbates the risk of mistake,
“politically motivated self-dealing, and outright malfeasance” in Executive Branch imple-
mentation of targeted restraints).
192 See, e.g., PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 24 (2003) (study of
nearly 10,000 sex offenders in fifteen states, 5.3% of whom were rearrested for a sex crime
within three years); Francis M. Williams, The Problem of Sexual Assault, in SEX OFFENDER
LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 17, 39–40 (Richard G. Wright ed., 2009) (describ-
ing a range of studies showing recidivism in the 2.5% to 27% range); see also infra note 121 R
(citing studies on recidivism rates).  The studies vary significantly in how they define recidi-
vism, the time period they study, and the data sources they use.  Most of these studies took
place before the introduction of residential, employment, and other restraints imposed on
sex offenders; more robust and informative studies are needed to study the effect of such
restraints.  The studies also do not distinguish between assaults by known assailants, such as
friends or family, and assaults by strangers, the latter of which is the focus of most sex
offender restrictions.
193 See Richard G. Wright, Introduction: The Failure of Sex Offender Policies, in SEX OF-
FENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 192, at 3, 4 (describing “the R
impact of the tragic, high-profile, stranger-predator sexual assault” as “[a] dominant factor
in the passage of these inefficacious sex offender laws”).
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2. Delisting Difficulties
It is incredibly difficult to disprove a propensity to do harm, even
when there is a fair and transparent process that allows one to do so.
The precautionary impulse that leads officials to err on the side of
restraint in the initial designation decision is exacerbated in the delist-
ing context.  Here, the ghost of Willie Horton haunts every public offi-
cial.194  What if the “freed” individual commits the bad act the
restraint was designed to prevent?  In such a situation, there is a fail-
ure not just of omission but also of commission.  Except in the rela-
tively rare cases of particularly sympathetic targets, Executive Branch
officials have strong incentives to maintain restraints and few incen-
tives to lift them.
Placing delisting decisions before a judge with life tenure or
other independent adjudicators freed from the political process can
minimize but will not eliminate the incentives in favor of maintaining
the restraint.  Just as it is impossible for the Executive to prove that an
individual will engage in whatever future bad act the restraint is de-
signed to prevent, so too is it impossible for the individual to prove
that he will not do so.  Judges, likewise, do not want to be responsible
for lifting a restraint on someone who commits a future bad act and,
as a result, often defer to Executive Branch determinations on matters
of national and community security.195
This is not to say that the Executive Branch and courts never take
steps to winnow down lists of individuals and entities subject to pre-
crime restraints.196  But the general trend is one of dramatic growth.
Since 2001, the total number of SDGTs has grown from 27 to over
700, with only a few dozen individuals and entities being delisted, as
194 Horton was a convicted felon in Massachusetts who committed rape and a violent
assault after being freed on a prison furlough program during Michael Dukakis’s tenure as
governor.  During the 1988 presidential election, George Bush used Horton’s case to at-
tack Dukakis, Bush’s Democratic opponent, for being soft on crime. See Catherine Enberg,
Book Review, 11 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 298, 298–99 (1995) (reviewing DAVID C. ANDER-
SON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA: HOW THE WILLIE HORTON STORY CHANGED
AMERICAN JUSTICE (1995)).
195 See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361,
1380 (2009) (surveying a range of national security–related cases and describing courts as
often being “loath to question the judgment of executive officials when push comes to
shove”).
196 Internal Executive Branch reviews and court orders have, for example, led to the
release or transfer of over 600 Guantanamo Bay detainees, all of whom were being held for
preventive purposes. See, e.g., The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo, (last accessed Sept. 14, 2013) (detailing history of detainee population at
Guantanamo).  But in recent years, Congress has imposed a number of restrictions on the
transfers, making it politically and legally difficult for the Obama Administration to take
steps to move out even those that have been cleared for transfer. See, e.g., National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, §§ 1027–1028, 126 Stat. 1632,
1914–17.  This is a classic example of the political and logistical difficulties associated with
undoing a restraint that has already been put in place.
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far as can be discerned from publicly available documents.197  The
number of individuals on the No Fly List reportedly has grown from
12 to 21,000198 in that same time period, and the number of sex of-
fenders registered nationally has grown to over 700,000.199
3. Incentive to Overreach
Whereas adjudication of guilt with respect to a past act presents a
binary choice—the individual either engaged in the conduct or did
not—adjudication of risk presents adjudicators with a sliding scale,
with no clear definition of what characteristics are deemed risky and
no limits as to how much risk is too much.  In the words of John Stuart
Mill: “[T]here is hardly any part of the legitimate freedom of action of
a human being which would not admit of being represented, and
fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of
delinquency.”200
This problem is exacerbated in the case of an unknown but po-
tentially grave or catastrophic harm.  In such a situation, the precau-
tionary principle justifies the application of increasingly broad
measures designed to preempt an expanding number of potential
risky actors.201  For undifferentiated rule-based restraints, this means
an increasingly loose fit between the risk and the restraint.  Thus, even
if only a small fraction of sex offenders is likely to offend in the future,
the risk posed by the few—coupled with the difficulties of accurately
predicting who will offend in the future—is deemed to justify the im-
position of broad restraints on significant numbers of persons who
197 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 13, at 5.  Information about delisted R
individuals and entities is based on a review of the Federal Register. See, e.g., Unblocking of
One Individual Specially Designated Global Terrorist Pursuant to Executive Order 13,224,
77 Fed. Reg. 25,234, 25,234 (Apr. 27, 2012) (removing name from SDGT list).  In some
cases, individuals were delisted only after they were deceased.  Other delistings were
prompted by litigation. See, e.g., ROTH ET AL., supra note 55, at 84–85 (describing delisting R
of three Swedes, two U.S.-based entities, and one U.S. citizen after a lawsuit was filed and
international pressure was brought to bear).  It is also possible that others were delisted
without any corresponding report in the Federal Register.
198 See supra note 20.  A report from the Inspector General suggests that in 2006, the R
list skyrocketed to over 70,000 “records” before being cut about in half. DOJ 2007 AUDIT,
supra note 88, at 31–32.  It is not clear, however, what is meant by “record.”  It is possible, R
for example, that multiple records targeted a single individual with only slight variations in
spelling or other identifying information.
199 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, Map of Registered Sex Of-
fenders, available at http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?Lang
uageCountry=en_US&PageId=1545 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).  Only a portion, however,
are subject to the residential, employment, and other restrictions that are the subject of
this Article.
200 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 145 (1865).
201 See Lucia Zedner, Fixing the Future? The Pre-emptive Turn in Criminal Justice, in REGU-
LATING DEVIANCE: THE REDIRECTION OF CRIMINALISATION AND THE FUTURES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 35, 44-47 (Bernadette McSherry, Alan Norrie & Simon Bronitt eds., 2009) (describing
the relationship between risk analysis and uncertainty).
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pose no such risk.202  For individualized, adjudicatory-type restraints,
it means increasingly broad—and often malleable and poorly tai-
lored—criteria for concluding that a specific individual poses a risk.
Moreover, as potential targets discover or are perceived to have discov-
ered ways to evade existing restraints, as occurs every time a previously
convicted sex offender reoffends or a threat to aviation security is re-
vealed, the natural governmental response is to increase the scope
and intensity of the restraints so as to encompass more would-be
evaders.203
The broad restrictions imposed on would-be financers of terror-
ism, the post-2009 growth in the No Fly List, and the expanding list of
triggering offenses and restrictions imposed on sex offenders are all
examples of the precautionary principle in practice.  The result is an
expansive and expanding set of pre-crime restraints.204
III
PRE-CRIME RESTRAINTS: UNDERSTANDING
AND SETTING SOME LIMITS
Given the important liberty interests at stake and the risks of er-
ror and overreach, this Part suggests a set of limits that ought to apply
to the government’s use of targeted pre-crime restraints.  As an over-
arching principle, this Article recognizes the government’s legitimate
interest in—and the courts’ approval of—certain targeted preventive
actions outside of or on the margins of the criminal justice system.  At
the same time, however, it calls on courts and legislators to demand a
much more narrow tailoring of restraint to perceived need than has
generally taken place to date.
Having just highlighted the many incentives that operate in favor
of expansion, I acknowledge that effective limit setting will not come
easy.  That said, courts can provide, and already have provided, critical
oversight with respect to analogous forms of preventive detention—
limits that can readily be transposed onto comprehensive, noncus-
todial restraints.205  Responsible legislators and Executive Branch offi-
202 See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 15, at 271–75 (noting that many residency restric- R
tions on sex offenders “are driven by public perceptions fueled by media attention to sen-
sational sex crimes” and that recidivism rates among sexual offenders are much lower than
generally assumed).
203 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 18 (discussing marked expansion of the No Fly List in R
reaction to the failed bombing of a Detroit-bound jetliner in 2009 and noting that the
government “lowered the standard for putting people on the list”).
204 See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOS-
ING THE WAR ON TERROR 28–33 (2007) (detailing the increasingly preventive tilt of the
law).
205 See, e.g., Klein & Wittes, supra note 31, at 123–69 (describing jurisprudence on pre- R
ventive detention pursuant to criminal justice, immigration, and civil commitment
authorities).
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cials also have an important role to play.  The following is directed at
both.
A. Punishment or Prevention?
There is a growing body of literature arguing that what I call pre-
crime restraint is actually “punitive prevention” and ought to either be
channeled through the criminal law or categorically prohibited.206
While these arguments have merit, they fail to squarely grapple with
the pressing question of what forms of preventive state action are, and
should be, permitted.
As applied to undifferentiated restraints imposed after a criminal
adjudication—the case for most sex offender–related restraints—the
reclassification of preventive restraints as punitive would prohibit
their retroactive application, without imposing any meaningful limits
on their prospective use.207  It would also have the negative conse-
quence of further blurring the preventive and punitive functions of
the law, with an almost inevitable mismatch between these func-
tions.208  Absent a reform of criminal law to fully embrace the preven-
tive purpose, criminal punishments will persist either too long or not
long enough to achieve the preventive goals.
206 See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Punitive Preventive Justice: A Critique, in PREVENTION
AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 252, 259 (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 2013) (“To
dispense with the adjudicated crime destabilizes.  It is what makes ‘punitive preventive
measures’ seem so dangerous.”); Janus, supra note 119, at 577 (warning against what the R
author calls “radical prevention”).  For a sampling of the literature arguing that pre-crime
prevention is actually punishment in disguise, see supra note 33. R
207 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113–14 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Alaska’s sex offender registration and notification scheme is punitive but suggesting it
was a permissible punishment going forward).  While there is a possibility that some nar-
row subset of restrictions might be deemed to violate the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, the vast majority of the restraints likely would survive a court chal-
lenge. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sen-
tence.  Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the
crime.” (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303 (1983))); Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to
the proportionality of particular sentences [are] exceedingly rare.”).
208 As many scholars have noted, the increasingly utilitarian-minded, preventive focus
of the criminal justice system has undermined the blaming and censoring function of pun-
ishment and thereby diluted one of its most important purposes. See, e.g., Larry Alexander
& Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 637,
661 (2012) (arguing that the criminal law should only punish culpable acts but that other
preventive restraints on liberty may be justified to deal with what they label “culpable ag-
gressors”); Robinson, supra note 152, at 1432 (warning that the preventive shift of the R
criminal justice system “perverts the justice process and undercuts the criminal justice sys-
tem’s long-term effectiveness in controlling crime”); Steiker, supra note 5, at 814 (arguing
that permitting punishment outside the “special [criminal] procedural regime” under-
mines “the usefulness of having a separate criminal process as a forum for blaming”). But
see Slobogin, supra note 152, at 122 (arguing that the preventive tilt of the criminal justice R
system should be embraced).
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As applied to national security, immigration-related, and other
Executive Branch–imposed restraints, a punishment frame would al-
most certainly provide prospective, procedural benefits, resulting in
enhanced criminal law procedural protections and increased trans-
parency as to the nature of the triggering action or offense.  Such pro-
cedural safeguards likely would yield concrete effects: helping to catch
outright errors, such as misidentification of a target, and presumably
leading to a lower incidence of such restraints.  That said, many of
these same preventive measures likely would be redefined as punish-
ment imposed in response to a range of inchoate and broadly defined
crimes.209  This could ultimately put targets in a worse-off position,
subjecting them to the long-term grip of the criminal justice system
when a temporary, short-lived preventive restraint might have ad-
dressed the state’s underlying security concern.210
From the perspective of promoting national and community se-
curity, such a shift also threatens to unduly tie the state’s hands, leav-
ing critical threats unchecked.  This Article focuses on the overlooked
liberty interests, risks of error, and pressures for expansion associated
with targeted, preventive restraints.  But it does not deny the state’s
important interest in minimizing the risk posed by dangerous individ-
uals to other innocent bystanders—including in situations where
criminal prosecution is not immediately feasible.  Imagine, for exam-
ple, a foreign partner provides credible information to the intelli-
gence community that a particular individual plans to detonate a
commercial airliner.  In such a case, the government has a strong, and
justifiable, interest in preventing that individual from boarding a
plane or at least subject him or her to extensive and potentially time-
consuming preboarding screening even if the Department of Justice
has not yet gathered enough usable evidence to build a criminal case.
In what follows, I assume that targeted, noncustodial preventive
restraints can serve a legitimate government interest.  I argue, how-
ever, that there ought to be much more meaningful limits on their
use and procedural protections in place than currently exist.
209 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 780, 782–91 (2006) (highlighting the ways in which the Supreme Court’s focus on
policing and trial procedure has left substantive criminal law and noncapital sentencing
largely unchecked).  For an example of the potentially broad reach of the criminal law, see
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2010) (upholding certain re-
straints on humanitarian support to designated terrorist organizations).
210 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 39, at 139–40 (describing pervasive and invasive R
collateral consequences imposed on convicted criminals); Chin, supra note 14 (same). R
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B. To the Courts
1. Near-Total Restraints
A searching inquiry into the liberty interests at stake should lead
courts to recognize the way in which comprehensive, noncustodial
restraints can impose a form of de facto imprisonment.  The
terrorism-related financial sanctions as applied to U.S. residents and
most extreme restrictions imposed on sex offenders fall into this cate-
gory.  They should be treated as analogous to—and subject to the
same limits as—preventive detention.  Just as the state is, outside the
context of wartime detention,211 prohibited from subjecting individu-
als to indefinite physical commitment based on a finding of danger-
ousness alone, so too should the state be prohibited from imposing
comprehensive and indefinite noncustodial restraints solely on a
theory that the individual or entity poses a future risk.212
Implicit in this approach to preventive detention is an apprecia-
tion of the significant liberty interests at stake, the ways in which pre-
ventive restraints fail to respect the moral autonomy of individuals,
and the need for strict limits on their use.213  The Supreme Court, for
example, has concluded that a prior conviction alone cannot justify
indefinite, preventive detention.214  Preventive detention based on
dangerousness alone is permitted in limited situations only: when it is
time-limited (such as for material witness or pretrial detentions),
based on a narrow tailoring of the government interest and preventive
restraint,215 and subject to a series of procedural safeguards, including
individualized assessments and court oversight.
211 Of course, even wartime detention is limited in time by the duration of the actual
armed conflict. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (“It is a clearly estab-
lished principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active
hostilities.”).
212 See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 419–20 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 358 (1997) (“A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient
ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment.”).
213 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the limits placed on preventive detention
are in practice as effective as they are in theory, or even ideal as a matter of theory. See, e.g.,
Steiker, supra note 23, at 781–92 (offering a powerful critique of the Court’s reasoning in R
Hendricks); see also ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS
AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTATIVE STATE 27 (2006) (arguing that the “judicial promises of
principled limitations” with respect to civil commitment for sex offenders “are belied in
application”).  These limits do, however, establish a set of susbstantive constraints, even if
excessively elastic, for when preventive detention can be applied.  Even these arguably
modest limits do not apply to targeted preventive measures that fall short of physical
incapacitation.
214 See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (requiring findings of “mental abnormality” and
dangerousness to justify indefinite involuntary commitment post-conviction); see also
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (holding that status as a deportable alien alone
cannot justify indefinite detention).
215 Although the Supreme Court has never in a majority opinion claimed to apply
“strict scrutiny” to the review of preventive detention, it has in practice required a narrow
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Comprehensive noncustodial restraints should be subject to these
same limits.  Such restraints would be permissible in two circum-
stances.  First, they could be applied as an alternative to otherwise
sanctioned forms of preventive detention, such as civil commitment,
detention of presumptively dangerous aliens, or pretrial detention,
but only for so long as and subject to the same procedural require-
ments applied to the equivalent form of preventive detention.  Sec-
ond, they could be permitted in additional, limited situations if
narrowly tailored to a discrete and compelling government need,
time-limited, and subject to court oversight, regular reviews, and indi-
vidualized assessments, among other procedural safeguards.
Under this approach, the most onerous residential, employment,
and other related restrictions on sex offenders would be subject to the
same substantive and procedural limits that apply to the civil commit-
ment of sex offenders.  Consistent with the Supreme Court holdings
in Kansas v. Hendricks216 and Kansas v. Crane,217 these restrictions
could be upheld only if based on an individualized assessment of dan-
gerousness and a finding of mental abnormality making it seriously
difficult for the individual to control his behavior.218  Adjudications
would take place before an independent adjudicator; the burden
would be placed on the government to prove that the criteria are met
by clear and convincing evidence; and the targeted individual would
be entitled to counsel, present evidence, and cross-examine the gov-
ernment’s witnesses.219  Regular reviews would help to ensure that the
conditions justifying the restraints persist.  Other less restrictive condi-
tions imposed on sex offenders that do not amount to near-total con-
trol could be imposed without meeting all of these requirements, but
there would need to be a much more nuanced means-ends tailoring
than currently takes place, as discussed below.
Similarly, the comprehensive prohibitions imposed on U.S. re-
sidents labeled as “specially designated global terrorists” would only
tailoring of the government interest and of the preventive, custodial restraint. See, e.g.,
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”); Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (describing detention scheme as lacking a “reasonable
relation” to the government purpose but, in practice, engaging in a much more searching
inquiry than bare rationality review generally employs); see also Klein & Wittes, supra note
31, at 88 (describing the ways in which preventive detention is countenanced but “only to R
the extent necessary to prevent [grave public] harms”).
216 521 U.S. at 369.
217 534 U.S. at 413.
218 To reiterate, I do not suggest that these systems of preventive civil commitment are
ideal—particularly as a matter of practice.  But they do impose important limits on who
can be subject to these restraints and, at least in theory, take into account the moral auton-
omy of their targets. See supra note 211. R
219 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (requiring a clear and con-
vincing standard of proof in involuntary commitment adjudications).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 49 10-JAN-14 11:17
2014] PRE-CRIME RESTRAINTS 375
be upheld if the government were able to establish that the prohibi-
tions are narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest and
that less restrictive means are unavailable.  Given expansive terrorism
statutes that permit prosecution and pretrial incapacitation of persons
alleged to have provided material support for terrorism and allow for
the issuance of civil injunctions to prevent future violations of the ma-
terial support laws, it is hard to imagine how the government could
establish that the current regime is both needed and narrowly tai-
lored.220  While some such sanctions might be permissible as a gap-
filler (i.e., to prevent a suspect group or individual from financing
terrorism during the early investigatory stages of a case in instances
where the availability of civil injunctions is determined to be insuffi-
cient), it is hard to explain a legitimate government need for such
comprehensive financial sanctions beyond such limited stopgap mea-
sures.  Moreover, if such a stopgap measure were adopted, it should
be time-limited.  The government should be required either to bring
a criminal case or to lift the restriction, as is the case with pretrial
detention and material witness warrants.221
One need not agree, however, with the specifics to accept the
basic insight: certain noncustodial pre-crime restraints impose such
pervasive restrictions on the ability to lead a free and meaningful life
that courts should treat them as a form of de facto imprisonment,
triggering the same substantive and procedural rights that apply to
preventive detention.222  The debate then shifts to an argument as to
the appropriate substantive and procedural limits that apply to the
core deprivation of liberty brought about by preventive detention,
whether de jure or de facto.  The outcome of that debate controls and
sets the limits for preventive detention and the equivalent forms of
220 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) (prohibiting provision of material support to
terrorism); id. § 2339B (prohibiting provision of material support or resources to desig-
nated terrorist organizations); id. § 2339C (prohibition against the financing of terrorism).
Subsection 2339B(c) explicitly authorizes the Attorney General to seek a civil injunction
whenever it “appears” that an individual is engaging in or “about to” engage in a violation
of the prohibition against providing material support to a designated terrorist organiza-
tion. Id. § 2339B(c).  Subsection (f) includes protections against the disclosure of classi-
fied evidence. Id. § 2339B(f).
221 See., e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2012) (“Release of a material witness may be delayed for
a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747
(1987) (emphasizing the time-limited nature of pretrial detention).
222 Analogous claims have been made in the context of habeas litigation, with regis-
tered sex offenders asserting constructive custody based on onerous registration and re-
porting requirements.  Although such claims have been rejected, courts have not yet
adjudicated a case in which the petitioner was subject to pervasive residential restrictions
and limitations on his or her movements in addition to registration requirements. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 337–38 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing cases); see also id. at 345–49
(Wynn, J., dissenting) (offering powerful argument as to why registered sex offender
should be deemed to be “in custody” for purposes of habeas jurisdiction).
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noncustodial restraint.  Pervasive noncustodial restraints can no
longer be left unregulated or subject to bare rationality review simply
because they do not physically place an individual behind bars.223
2. Partial Incapacitation
Most noncustodial pre-crime restraints are not so comprehensive
that they can be fairly analogized to de facto imprisonment.  But they
too should be subject to heightened substantive scrutiny and procedu-
ral limits.  Absent compelling reasons to the contrary, courts should
demand a tailored, adjudicatory model, which will help to reduce the
risk of error and better reflect the moral autonomy of its targets, even
if it cannot fully cure the problem of false positives.  Such an ap-
proach concededly may increase the number of false negatives given
the near-impossibility of complete accuracy in the prediction of risk.
But some degree of risk assumption is both necessary—and inher-
ent—in any society that calls itself free; efforts to eliminate all risk
lead toward a totalitarian society in which the government attempts to
maximize security by maximizing control.224
Substantive Limits
As described in detail in Part II, partial, targeted restraints deny
their targets respect for their moral autonomy and equal treatment,
treating them as less worthy than those not subject to the restraint,
stamping them as dangerous, and failing to give them an opportunity
to make the “right” choice and thereby prove their moral worthiness.
This in and of itself should prompt additional scrutiny by courts.  A
more searching inquiry will also reveal the way in which many such
restraints infringe specific, substantive liberty interests that the Su-
preme Court has declared worthy of protection, thus triggering due
process concerns.225
223 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1095, 1121 (2009) (describing “arbitrary and capricious review whose intensity has been
dialed down to a minimum”).
224 That said, there are an array of risk-prevention initiatives that are not coercive and
targeted, ranging from the simple self-protection measures like installation of alarm sys-
tems to traffic-control measures to early childhood education. See, e.g., James J. Heckman
& Dimitriy V. Masterov, The Productivity Argument for Investing in Young Children 12 (Comm.
for Econ. Dev., Invest in Kids Working Group, Working Paper No. 5, 2004), available at
http://jenni.uchicago.edu/Invest/FILES/dugger_2004-12-02_dvm.pdf (noting that
“[o]ne of the best-established empirical regularities in economics is that education reduces
crime” and presenting evidence that investment in early childhood education can reduce
crime).
225 See supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text.  Professor Murphy discusses equal R
protection analysis as a possible doctrinal hook for evaluating these types of restraints,
highlighting the ways in which targeted preventive measures should be understood as im-
pacting discrete and insular minorities.  Murphy, supra note 21, at 1404–05.  While I con- R
sider equal protection principles as relevant to an analysis of the liberty consequences of
targeted noncustodial restraints, see supra Part II.A.2, I am skeptical that equal protection
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Given these costs, courts should demand more than a mere ra-
tional relationship between the government’s stated interest and the
restraint being imposed.  Reviewing courts should instead engage in a
searching assessment of how a particular scheme furthers the stated
governmental interest, how it burdens liberty interests, and whether
there are reasonably available and less burdensome ways of furthering
the relevant government interest.  Unless the burden is proportional
to the government interest, it should not survive.  If there are other
reasonably available and less intrusive alternatives, they should be ap-
plied.226
A searching inquiry into the No Fly List, for example, reveals the
way it burdens, albeit without extinguishing, long-recognized interests
in interstate travel, association, and pursuit of employment of one’s
choosing.  Among the many questions that the courts should ask: Is
there a sound basis for concluding that individuals who meet the (still
secret) criteria pose a threat to aviation security?  Is the restriction on
travel—and all of the related intrusions on individual liberty—propor-
tionate to the interest in aviation security?  Are there reasonably avail-
able alternatives, such as extensive body and luggage searches or
deployment of air marshals, for protecting against the threat?  Ulti-
mately, the courts should be pushing the Executive toward a narrow
tailoring of restraint to need.
Courts also should examine how these answers change over time.
It might be legitimate, for example, to prevent a suspected terrorist
from boarding a plane soon after the government learns of his in-
volvement in a nascent terrorist plot.  But why is it legitimate for the
restraint to last months or years in the absence of sufficient evidence
to bring a criminal charge for an inchoate conspiracy or attempt
crime?  What might be permissible as a stopgap measure might not
still be justified months or years later.
analysis will do much work without a separate and independent determination that the
scheme also infringes certain fundamental liberty interests. See Michael C. Dorf, Equal Pro-
tection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 962 n.35 (2002) (offering an interesting analysis of
the interaction between equal protection, fundamental rights, and substantive due
process).
226 This approach tracks the careful interest balancing suggested by Justice Stephen
Breyer in, among other places, his dissenting opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller.  554
U.S. 570, 693 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1336–37 (2007) (suggesting that even strict scrutiny has in
many instances collapsed into such a proportionality test, in which courts balance interests
and assess marginal risks). But see Steiker, supra note 5, at 777 (warning of the many limits R
of proportionality analysis as a check on preventive restraints).  While I do not intend to
suggest that such a balancing test analysis will fully counter the incentives toward overreach
and expansion discussed in Part II, such an approach provides a way, consistent with cur-
rent doctrine, to set some outer limits as to what is constitutionally permissible when the
state seeks to restrain preventively.
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At least one recent ruling has demonstrated that courts are well
positioned to engage in the type of searching inquiry and analysis I
suggest here.  As discussed in Part I.C, in In re Taylor, a California ap-
pellate court examined a challenge to residential restrictions imposed
on paroled sex offenders in San Diego.227  Drawing on a well-devel-
oped lower-court record, the appellate court examined in detail the
practical effect of the restrictions, highlighting the ways the restric-
tions relegated such offenders to less than three percent of the city’s
residences, prohibited offenders from living with family members,
and effectively rendered many offenders homeless.228  It concluded
that the restrictions significantly burdened the right to travel, were
not narrowly tailored to a compelling government need, and were
therefore unconstitutional.229  While the court concluded that such
restrictions can still be imposed based on an individualized assessment
of threat and need, it ruled that they can no longer be applied to all
registered sex offenders without a particularized assessment of the risk
posed.230  While the ruling is, as of this writing, suspended pending
review by the California Supreme Court,231 it offers precisely the ap-
proach I suggest here.
Procedural Limits
In addition to ensuring that the substantive criteria for being sub-
ject to a particular restraint are appropriately tailored to need, courts
should demand heightened procedural protections in the application
of any restraints that survive a substantive challenge.  Applying the
prevailing Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test,232 procedural require-
ments will vary depending on three key factors: the extent of the dep-
rivation and individual interest affected; the risk of erroneous
deprivation and probable value of additional procedural safeguards;
and the governmental interests at stake, including the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens of additional procedural safeguards.  A proper
calibration of the liberty interest should tip the scale in favor of in-
creased procedural requirements.  Given the preventive nature of
these restraints and the obvious difficulties in predicting the future,
227 See In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 83 (Cal. App. 2012), review granted and opinion
suspended, In re Taylor, 290 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2013).
228 See id.
229 See id.; discussion supra Part I.C.
230 Id. at 83–84.
231 In re Taylor, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566 (Cal. 2013).
232 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).  While the Taylor case involved a challenge brought by a
class of sex offenders on parole, the underlying law being challenged applied to all regis-
tered sex offenders, and nothing about the court’s reasoning would limit the holding to
parolees only.  To the contrary, parolees’ liberty is deemed “partial and restricted.” In re
Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 76 (citing Prison Law Office v. Koenig, 186 Cal. App. 3d 560,
566–67 (Cal. App. 1986)).
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the risk of error also ought to be understood as high, thereby pointing
to the value of, and need for, additional procedural safeguards.
Such a recalibrated Mathews balancing should yield a set of mini-
mal procedural safeguards in the imposition of preventive restraints,
including transparency as to the criteria justifying the pre-crime re-
straint, postdeprivation notice, a meaningful opportunity to challenge
the restraint before an independent adjudicator, and individualized,
periodic reviews of any restraint that imposes an ongoing depriva-
tion.233  This is consistent with the tailored, adjudicatory model of pre-
crime restraints described in Part I.D.  Where applicable, the Execu-
tive should provide an unclassified summary of classified information
relied on in making the underlying designation decision or grant
cleared counsel access to the classified information—something that
courts have already begun to demand in the context of the
terrorism-related financial sanction regime.234
Absent a compelling justification otherwise, restraints should be
presumptively time limited.  At a minimum, there ought to be an ef-
fective mechanism by which targets may rebut a presumption of con-
tinuing dangerousness or apply for some sort of exemption.235
To be clear, such safeguards can hardly be expected to offer an
equal counterweight to the risk aversion of adjudicators and legisla-
tors and many other incentives in favor of overbreadth and over-
reach.236  They can, however, provide important protections on the
margins, minimizing cases of misidentification and providing relief
for those who would not or could not possibly commit the types of
crimes the restraints are designed to protect against—such as, for ex-
ample, physically disabled sex offenders.
3. The Cumulative Effect
In some cases, a series of partial restraints might each individually
pass constitutional muster yet together operate as a comprehensive set
233 This final qualification is meant to distinguish restraints such as stop-and-frisks,
which are relatively fleeting, from restraints like the No Fly List or revocation of an employ-
ment license, which have ongoing and significant impacts on where one can go and what
they can do.  I do not argue that every stop-and-frisk should to be subject to judicial review.
If, however, a particular individual were designated a presumptively dangerous individual
and subject to a stop-and-frisk on a daily basis as a result, that would be a case for which
independent oversight is warranted.
234 See supra Part I.A.
235 This will undoubtedly add to the costs of administering such restraints.  In some
limited instances, the state may be able to demonstrate that the administrative burden of
regular reviews or delisting mechanisms is excessively high relative to the individual inter-
est at stake.  But in most cases, regular reviews and delisting mechanisms should be under-
stood as essential moderating influences on the state’s impulse to manage risk through
targeted restraint.
236 See supra note 226. R
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of restraints akin to total imprisonment.  Professor Gabriel Chin, for
example, has persuasively argued that the combination of collateral
consequences imposed on convicted criminals is akin to the imposi-
tion of civil death.237  Professor Michelle Alexander has made a simi-
lar point, describing the combination of collateral consequences as
the new Jim Crow.238  The combination of nonpunitive restraints im-
posed on persons who have not even been convicted of a crime can
have a similarly dramatic effect.
Because each regime operates in isolation, often with specific and
discrete means of implementation and review, individuals lack an ef-
fective mechanism to challenge the combined effect of such restraints
even in cases amounting to de facto imprisonment.239  This should
change.  Congress should enact a cause of action providing a mecha-
nism for targets to challenge the combined effect of such restraints.
In the interim, courts could begin to recognize a cause of action in
the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on a claim of
constructive imprisonment.  Named defendants would include those
responsible for each discrete restraint as well as the attorney general
of the implementing sovereign.240  The attorneys general should have
the responsibility of defending—or mitigating—the combined opera-
tion of the restraints within their jurisdiction.
C. To Legislatures and the Executive Branch
In Part II.B, I described in detail the ways in which legislatures
and Executive Branch officials are pushed to manage risk, err on the
side of caution, and expand restraints in response to real or perceived
security threats, even if the expansions provide only a false sense of
security.  At some point, however, the restraints become so expansive
that they are no longer limited to the “other” and become a concern
of “us.”  This in turn often triggers the kind of self-reflection and polit-
ical action that can lead to change.
This happened in Georgia, for example, when Wendy Whitaker, a
white woman who was subject to onerous registration requirements
and residential limits based on a consensual act of oral sex engaged in
as a teenager, became a poster child for the excessive restrictions im-
posed on sex offenders.  Her story, and litigation, prompted the Geor-
gia legislature to pass a law allowing certain offenders to petition the
court for removal from the registry—a change she ultimately bene-
237 Chin, supra note 14. R
238 ALEXANDER, supra note 39, at 178–79. R
239 See Murphy, supra note 21, at 1378–79 (raising concerns about the cumulative ef- R
fect of multiple restraints imposed by a multitude of actors).
240 Legislation is likely needed, particularly given that in many instances the restraints
are imposed by multiple sovereigns. See id.
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fited from.241  Similarly, when former Senator Edward M. Kennedy as-
serted in 2004 that he was on a No Fly List, based on several instances
in which he had been stopped and questioned before flying, Congress
suddenly became interested, at least briefly, in reviewing alleged er-
rors associated with the No Fly List.242
In other instances budgetary concerns yield the impetus for
change.  Lake Forest, California, for example, lifted restrictions on sex
offenders entering public parks and beaches in order to avoid the
costs of defending legal challenges.243
These moments provide important opportunities for legislatures
and Executive Branch officials to take steps to rein in otherwise over-
broad statutes, regulations, and practices.  They also point to the need
for more responsible dialogue and analysis to accurately match the
risk and restraint from the outset.  Certain key principles ought to
guide the decision making.
First, Executive Branch officials and legislatures should engage in
a more thorough accounting of the precise governmental interest at
stake and the liberty consequences of proposed restraints, closely tai-
lor the restraint to the need, and consider less restrictive means of
achieving the same goals.  While the incentives often push in favor of
expanding targeted prevention, a combination of budgetary pres-
sures, commitment to responsible governance, and pressure from civil
society can help promote this type of searching inquiry.
Second, undifferentiated, rule-based restraints imposed by the
Executive Branch alone should be categorically avoided.  The Execu-
tive Branch should not be able to conclude, for example, that some
percentage of men and women from East Asia between the ages of
eighteen and thirty pose a risk to aviation security and therefore any-
one who fits that profile can be permanently barred from flying.244
To the extent that Executive Branch–imposed restraints are permit-
ted, they should be based on an individualized fact-finding process
241 Bill Rankin, Restricted by Registry No More, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 18, 2010, at 1B.
Her lawsuit also prompted several other changes in the law, most of which are designed to
alleviate the retroactive consequences of the restrictions. See H.R. 571, 2009–2010 Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2010).
242 See Sara Kehaulani Goo, Sen. Kennedy Flagged by No Fly List, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,
2004, at A01.
243 See Sarah de Crescenzo, Backpedal on Sex-Offender Ban Gets Officials’ Attention, OR-
ANGE COUNTY REG. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/city-379823-sex-cit
ies.html; Sarah de Crescenzo, Lake Forest Moves to Overturn Sex-Offender Ban, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/sex-379693-county-city
.html.
244 Such a policy would obviously trigger equal protection concerns. See Dorf, supra
note 225, at 960.  These same principles also ought to protect against the imposition of the R
No Fly List on all persons who have blue eyes and a dimple based on statistical evidence
suggesting that persons with blue eyes and a dimple are more likely to pose a threat to
aviation security.
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with a well-developed administrative record, consistent with an adjudi-
catory model of pre-crime restraints. There also should be trans-
parency as to the criteria for imposing the restraint, post-deprivation
notice, and an opportunity for meaningful review.  Additional means
of circumscribing executive discretion should be considered, includ-
ing executive audits of the type suggested by Professor Mariano-
Florentino Cuellar245 and vigorous oversight by inspectors general.
Third, undifferentiated, rule-based restraints following a criminal
law adjudication of guilt should be imposed only if the following crite-
ria are met: there is a sound, empirical basis for the legislature to con-
clude that individuals who have been adjudicated guilty of a particular
offense are likely to commit whatever future bad act the restraint is
designed to prevent; the restraint is effective in reducing the risk
posed; and individualized assessments would either be ineffective (be-
cause of difficulties in predicting) or excessively burdensome (be-
cause of the administrative costs) relative to the liberty interests at
stake.
Fourth, restrictions on seemingly innocuous activity—such as go-
ing to the park or buying groceries—should demand a higher show-
ing of need than restraints on access to inherently dangerous items or
knowledge—such as access to guns, the piloting of planes, or security
clearances.
Fifth, given their future-oriented nature and associated risks of
error, all such restraints ought to be subject to regular reviews.  At a
minimum, there ought to be a meaningful opportunity for a targeted
individual to seek an exemption or otherwise establish that he or she
does not pose the type of risk the restraint is intended to protect
against.
* * *
Some likely will object that these proposed limits will be overly
burdensome, preventing the state from taking needed steps to deal
with dangerous individuals.  But this framework does not prohibit the
use of necessary restraints.  Rather, the restraints must be tailored and
proportionate to a compelling government objective, implemented in
a manner consistent with the preventive purpose, and subject to
meaningful external oversight.  Procedural requirements will doubt-
less increase the administrative burden on the government, but they
are essential to ensure that deprivations of liberty based on a targeted
assessment of dangerousness do not persist longer than necessary to
serve the preventive purpose.  There is, in fact, a persuasive argument
that such measures may in fact increase public safety by forcing legisla-
245 See Cuellar, supra note 191, at 125–31. R
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tors and Executive Branch officials to define and pinpoint perceived
threats with more accuracy and by eliminating the false security associ-
ated with overbroad restraints that are pervasive but often ineffective.
Conversely, some will argue that these recommendations are un-
duly permissive, allowing “punitive”246 or “radical”247 prevention to
persist when it should be prohibited altogether.  This is a reasonable
objection, but it fails to grapple with the pervasive use of, acceptance
of, and legitimate government interest in both physical and nonphysi-
cal forms of prevention.  Once one accepts, for example, that nar-
rowly targeted and time-limited preventive detention is permissible in
limited situations—a view that I hold248—then analogous (or less re-
strictive) noncustodial restraints must similarly be permitted.  The
question remains one of setting the appropriate limits.
A more compelling critique focuses on the limits of either court
review or legislative or Executive Branch restraint.  This Article’s pro-
posed framework rests on the assumption that one of two things will
happen: either (i) targeted individuals will challenge the restraints,
cases will be heard on the merits, courts will engage in a searching
and thorough analysis of the individual interest at stake, and they will
set meaningful and appropriate limits; or (ii) legislatures and execu-
tives will independently rein in the use of such restraints on their own.
There is ample room for skepticism that either will occur.249  But
likely imperfection in implementation is not a reason to abandon all
hope for reform.  If taken seriously, the proposed framework should
provide litigants with persuasive arguments as to why their cases
should be heard and provide courts with a better set of tools to evalu-
ate them.  Notably, this framework does not demand what would likely
be an unrealistic overhaul of existing doctrine.  Instead, it provides
courts and litigants with the analytic tools to understand, evaluate,
and limit this expanding set of pre-crime restraints while applying the
governing doctrinal framework.
Meanwhile, civil society can play an important role in raising the
profile of the otherwise invisible targets of such measures by highlight-
246 Harcourt, supra note 206, at 254–57. R
247 Janus, supra note 119, at 32–34. R
248 See, e.g., Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention
and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1231–34 (2013) (ac-
cepting the use of law of war detention but offering a framework for limiting its use).
249 A related but different critique is premised on concerns about activist courts sec-
ond-guessing legislative judgments.  This, of course, raises a much broader debate about
the proper role of the judiciary.  As is apparent from this Article, I adopt a view of the
judiciary as playing an important countermajoritarian role, even if only a modest one. See,
e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of Constitutional Decision-Making,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 303 (2010) (describing a third legislative chamber theory of
judicial review that functions by “nudg[ing] the legal system off of a rights-under-protective
point and onto a somewhat less under-protective or slightly overprotective point”).
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ing any excesses or abuses, and by promoting a more responsible de-
bate.  If asked whether the government should be able to keep
dangerous terrorists off airplanes, most people would answer yes.  If,
however, the question is whether the Executive should have unreview-
able discretion to label someone a suspected terrorist and perma-
nently bar him from flying, the unanimity fades.  In reframing the
questions to better reflect the liberty interests and risks of error associ-
ated with pre-crime restraints, civil society can help to rein in the in-
centives for overreach and expansion.250
Legislators and Executive Branch officials also should take note
of the ways in which overreach can ultimately yield to judicial invalida-
tion or political backlash, divert limited resources from where they are
needed most, and, if excessively broad, be so inconsistently enforced
that serious threats may fall through the gaps.  This should yield
self-discipline in both the design and the implementation of such
restraints.
Finally, it is also worth noting that there are an array of other
risk-management tools available that do not target particular individu-
als or classes of individuals with affirmative restraints that may be
equally, if not more, effective in reducing risk—including, for exam-
ple, mental health treatment, investment in childhood education, and
public education campaigns.  Legislators and Executive Branch offi-
cials should not assume a static world in which ratcheting up targeted,
coercive prevention is the only means of enhancing community safety;
supplementary and alternative forms of managing risk ought to be
invested in and employed.251
CONCLUSION
Noncustodial pre-crime restraints are a pervasive part of our legal
landscape.  They have ballooned over the last two decades and are
likely to grow, particularly as technological advances and other inno-
vations make it increasingly easy to monitor and control without
resorting to the prison cell.252  But while there is an extensive litera-
ture on both punishment and preventive detention,253 there has been
250 See, e.g., David Cole, Where Liberty Lies: Civil Society and Individual Rights After 9/11, 57
WAYNE L. REV. 1203, 1256–61 (2012) (arguing that nongovernmental organizations played
a critically important and effective role in curtailing government overreach in response to
the 9/11 attacks).
251 See supra note 224; see also Allegra M. McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence: R
The Possibilities of Unfinished Alternatives, 13 UNBOUND 109, 124–32 (2013) (describing the
possibility of alternative order-maintaining functions that do not involve coercive
restraints).
252 See supra Part II.A.
253 See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text. R
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insufficient attention to the array of noncustodial, nonpunitive re-
straints designed to prevent future bad acts.
This Article highlights three such regimes—the No Fly List, the
targeted financial sanction regime, and the restrictions imposed on
purportedly dangerous sex offenders—as illustrative of the growth of
the preventive state.  It demonstrates how certain noncustodial re-
straints so fully restrict the capacity to lead a free and meaningful life
that they ought to be treated as a form of de facto imprisonment.  It
also exposes the ways in which all pre-crime restraints create inherent
risks of error, abuse, and overreach; stamp their targets with a badge
of inferiority; and fail to respect their targets’ moral autonomy.  This
Article calls on courts, legislatures, and the Executive Branch to mean-
ingfully and reasonably limit their use and offers a framework for do-
ing so.
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